

AMBASSADORS IN
GOLDEN-AGE MADRID

The Court of Philip IV
through Foreign Eyes

edited by
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and
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PROLOGUE: NATIONALISM AND TRANSNATIONALISM IN THE COURT OF SPAIN

JOHN H. ELLIOTT

In the summer of 1963 Lord Hailsham, at that time the British Minister for Science, came back from Moscow, where he had been sent as the emissary of the Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, to take part in negotiations being conducted with the Russians for partial nuclear disarmament. He returned to London with presents for Macmillan from his opposite number, Nikita Krushchev, the Premier of the Soviet Union. These consisted of caviar, crab meat and wine. Macmillan reciprocated with a vase and some Stilton cheese.¹ It was one further, and rather banal, episode in the long story of diplomatic gift-giving that is a central theme of this book.

Madrid, the seat of the Spanish court since 1561, was a great, and perhaps the greatest, European centre for the exchange of diplomatic gifts during the later sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Effectively the capital of a world-wide monarchy, the *Monarquía española*, Madrid exercised a gravitational pull over the representatives of the other states of Europe, whether they were enemies or rivals, allies or satellites of the Spanish crown. At least until the 1640s and 1650s, when Spain's European hegemony ceased to be taken for granted, the Spanish Habsburg monarchs, Philip II, Philip III and Philip IV, enjoyed a commanding position on the international stage. They and their ministers therefore needed to be courted and wooed, and an essential part of the wooing process was the giving of gifts.

As this volume makes abundantly clear, there was nothing simple or straightforward about giving a present in early modern Europe. It was conditioned by considerations of rank and hierarchy, it was embedded in the conventions of protocol and ceremonial that defined and embalmed court culture, and it was shrouded in a series of arcane rituals that make its practice almost incomprehensible to modern readers. It touched on questions of honour and reputation that lay at the heart of civilized society, and was capable of arousing such

1. Engraved title page to *Política indiana* (detail), by Juan de Solórzano (Madrid, 1648, folio). Madrid, Biblioteca Nacional de España.

1 HENNESSY (2019), p. 363.



6a. Diego Velázquez, *Philip IV Dressed for the Hunt* (detail), c. 1633. Oil on canvas, 189 × 124 cm. Madrid, Museo Nacional del Prado.




6b. Anthony van Dyck, *Charles I Dressed for the Hunt* (detail), c. 1635. Oil on canvas, 266 × 207 cm. Paris, Musée du Louvre.

The very use of the word ‘Hispaniolized’ reflects a sense of distinctive national identity—in this instance Spanish national identity—that generated widespread discussion in a Europe caught up in the throes of intense political and religious conflict. The more that countries borrowed from, and imitated, each other, the more anxious they became to cultivate their own image and scrutinize that of their rivals. The interplay of national differences and similarities, simultaneously acknowledging the realities of enmity while holding out the possibility of future friendship, was the theme of Carlos García’s famous treatise of 1617 on the antipathy of the French and the Spanish.²⁴ Every country is sensitive about how it is viewed by others, and, as the policies pursued by the courts of Philip IV and later of Louis XIV make

clear, monarchs and their ministers found new and more elaborate ways of projecting on the international stage the image of themselves that they wanted to convey. For Olivares, Philip was the ‘king of kings’, whose nominal position as the ruler of the greatest monarchy on earth demanded a cultural as well as a political and military programme that would underline his superiority in the arts both of war and peace. The construction of the palace of the Buen Retiro in the 1630s, royal patronage of artists, playwrights, poets and men of letters, the mounting of fiestas and lavish stage spectacles, were all designed to win immortal fame for Philip and impress visiting foreign dignitaries and ambassadors with his power, wealth and magnificence (fig. 7).²⁵ They certainly impressed the Duke of Modena and Fulvio Testi.

²⁴ GARCÍA (1617/1979); and see Bertrand Haan’s chapter in this volume, p. 160.

²⁵ BROWN AND ELLIOTT (1980/2003).



TEATRO
DE LAS GRANDEZAS
de la Villa de Madrid Corte de
los Reyes Catolicos de
España
AL MVY PODEROSO
SEÑOR REY
Don FILIPE III.

POR EL MAESTRO
Gil Gonçalez Dauiña
su Coronista

THE MADRID OF THE AMBASSADORS UNDER PHILIP IV

JORGE FERNÁNDEZ-SANTOS


In Room 2 of the National Portrait Gallery (NPG) hangs a one-of-a-kind anonymous oil painting on panel (fig. 2). Its dating to around 1596 is based on the assumption it must have been commissioned shortly after the death of Sir Henry Unton (c. 1558–1596) by his widow Dorothy Wroughton as a posthumous commemoration. Catalogued as a highly unusual ‘narrative portrait’, its centre is taken up by Unton’s likeness flanked by Fame and Death. Ten scenes unfold anticlockwise from the bottom right-hand corner: Unton nursed by his mother; studies at Oxford; Grand Tourist crossing the Alps en route to Venice and Padua; military service in the Netherlands; last and ill-fated diplomatic mission to France; death while attended to by a physician sent by Henry IV; repatriation of mortal remains across the Channel; the hearse on its way to Wadley House at Faringdon; life at Wadley House, from where the funeral procession departs; and the funeral in progress with the funerary monument to be built in the foreground.¹ The widow referred to the painting in her will as a ‘story picture’ and Roy Strong preferred to call it ‘an Elizabethan memorial picture’.² Apparently, no similar painting in vignettes covering an early modern ambassador’s entire lifespan has survived. We would be of course mistaken to expect to find an equivalent for any of the foreign ambassadors to Philip IV’s court, including those covered in this volume, or for those the Planet King sent to foreign courts.³ Several from the former group, as we shall see, died in Madrid while discharging their duties. Yet, despite its rarity, the anonymous painting calls attention to what may be described as an increasingly widespread historical self-consciousness among early modern diplomats and their closest relatives. Like Dorothy Wroughton before her, Lady Ann Fanshawe took it upon herself to erect a tomb to remember her late husband by—one which, unlike Unton’s, has survived and which Piers Baker-Bates describes as a ‘sizeable but standard’ wall monument whose diminished visual

1. Title page to *Teatro de las grandezas de la villa de Madrid corte de los Reyes Católicos de España*, de Gil González Dávila (Madrid, 1623, folio). Madrid, Biblioteca Nacional de España.

1 The relevant cataloguing data is available online: <https://www.npg.org.uk/collections/search/portrait/mw06456/Sir-Henry-Unton>.

2 STRONG (1965), pp. 53, 72. See also: <https://www.npg.org.uk/research/programmes/making-art-in-tudor-britain/case-studies/the-portrait-of-sir-henry-untou-c.-1558-1596>.

3 OCHOA BRUN (2005) and see the Epilogue to this book.



THE PERSUASIVE DIPLOMACY OF GIFTS

JOSÉ LUIS COLOMER

The present volume brings together a diverse but coherent anthology of essays on embassies to the court of Philip IV which builds on the wealth of scholarship on early modern diplomacy and the foreign relations of Habsburg Spain.¹ While not aspiring to fully cover the subject, the fourteen case studies it includes paint a broad picture of exchanges between a composite monarchy at pains to preserve its hegemonic role and a variety of powers ranging from city-state through republic to kingdom and empire. The connections with such a vast territorial network are scrutinised by an international group of academics, museum curators and independent researchers, who thus provide a dialogue between disciplines but also different approaches to diplomatic history.

Despite the diversity of their areas of expertise, most of the contributors to this publication share an interest in the exchange of gifts as a standard practice in the interactions of states. The giving and receiving of gifts runs through the entire book as an indispensable ingredient of diplomacy between European powers. Much attention is paid by our authors to the manner in which precious artefacts and prized goods were chosen and intended as tokens of gratitude or appreciation; the rituals of their display and presentation are taken into consideration as part of the protocol that had a central place in court society; and many of these essays likewise focus on the significance of gifts and their role in the success of a negotiation, but also on the numerous conflicts that arose over how they were interpreted.

Such meticulous swaps across political and religious boundaries are an object of keen analysis nowadays, as historiography of the gift has expanded into a subfield of research in itself.² Based on anthropological studies that regard

1. Adam Frans van der Meulen after a drawing by Charles Le Brun, *Meeting of Louis XIV and Philip IV on the Isle of Pheasants*, 1660. Oil on copper, 56.5 × 39.7 cm. London, private collection.

1 MATTINGLY (1955). ROOSEN (1976). OCHOA BRUN (2006). BÉLY (2007).

2 For the period that concerns us, see KOMTER (1996), DAVIS (2000), OSTEEN (2002), KRAUSMAN BEN-AMOS (2008), HEAL (2014) and VON BERNSTORFF AND KUBERSKY PIREDDA (2014).

Infanta Maria Teresa's christening as godfather, he was invested with the Order with the Golden Fleece and given two Velázquezes: the splendid portrait for which he sat during his stay in Madrid, now in the Pinacoteca Estense, and a miniature of Philip IV that was mounted on the reverse of a diamond eagle.⁴⁰

Painted portraits were an important means of self-representation and of taking sides in the European wars, and sovereigns therefore used them for specific political purposes: here we see how Władysław Vasa had his ambassador Mąkowski stop off in Brussels during his first trip to Spain in 1627 to present the by then widowed regent Isabella, Philip IV's aunt, with a three-quarter-length portrait of himself in Spanish attire by Rubens—an indication of his hopes of garnering support from the Habsburgs for the ongoing war with Sweden (see Kieniewicz and Urjasz-Raczko, fig. 4). Similar undertones of political alliance pervade many portraits of Philip IV, which, although not gifts from the king, nevertheless required his approval as they were commissioned by foreign representatives in Madrid to take back with them to their countries of origin as a sign of hispanophilia or, at least, as a testament to their prestigious mission in Spain. It was a common gesture among papal envoys: we know that the nuncios Giulio Sacchetti (1625) and Giovanni Battista Pamphilj (1630) had copies made at the Alcázar or at the residence of the Count-Duke of Olivares of likenesses of the royal family which they later hung in their Roman palaces. Similarly, in 1657 Camillo Massimo, who had already sat for Diego Velázquez in Rome in 1650, may have obtained from the painter of *Las Meninas* original portraits of the king and queen and the infantas, which he subsequently displayed alongside the splendid works in his residence on the Via delle Quattro Fontane. In general, the picture galleries of the cardinals' impressive palaces proudly attested to the political affiliation of their owners, who drew attention to their services rendered to one of the powers then vying for control of Europe: as a member of a family with longstanding ties to Spain and a prominent international agent of Philip IV, Cardinal Girolamo Colonna hung in his apartments a likeness of himself together with pictures of the pope, the emperor and the Spanish royal family. The latter were probably the portraits



5. Round watch cover with an enamel portrait of Philip IV framed by a garland of flowers and ribbons, also painted on enamel, c. 1665. Gold, enamel and brass, 60 mm (diameter), 25 mm (thickness). La Chaux-de-Fonds (Switzerland), Musée international d'horlogerie.

he took back with him from Madrid at the end of his stint at the court in the 1620s. Cardinal Francesco Barberini also commissioned several likenesses of the royal family at the end of his trip to Spain as legate a latere in 1626; two decades later, although portraits of the Bourbons were predominant in his Roman residence as a result of his preferential relations with France, several portraits of Philip IV—full-length and in other formats—also hung there, as did a likeness of Prince Baltasar Carlos.⁴¹

The tokens of royal gratitude and generosity listed here also include Spanish purebred horses, highly appreciated by their recipients as they enjoyed great prestige among the international elites. A 'very good' grey specimen seemed to be a most appropriate and thoughtful farewell gift for the Ottoman envoy Ahmed Agha in 1650, news of whose skilled horsemanship had reached the ears of the court.⁴²

⁴⁰ COLOMER (2002).

⁴¹ SALORT (2001). COLOMER (2003a). BEAVEN (2010). BODART (2011).

⁴² See Jorge Fernández-Santos and Hüseyin Serdar Tabakoğlu's chapter in this volume, p. 483.

‘CHAPEL’
AMBASSADORS



FROM VENICE TO MADRID, AND BACK AGAIN: THE VENETIAN AMBASSADOR GIACOMO QUERINI

GINO BENZONI

VENETIAN PERCEPTIONS OF IMPERIAL SPAIN:
FROM FEAR AND PHOBIA TO PRUDENT CAUTION

When, on 4 November 1619, Giacomo Querini¹ was born to a patrician family in Venice (fig. 1)—and thus automatically destined by his noble birth to a career in politics—relations between Venice and Spain flowed smoothly, in the pursuit of a continuity that had begun in the mid-1500s and was to endure until 1796. This consorting between the two capitals was nourished by ceremonious exchange: the great reverence for the Catholic Kings on the part of the Serenissima was reciprocated by the monarchs with declarations of esteem, for the reigning Doge as well as for the state he embodied. Diplomacy also consists of these qualities: the utmost possible courtesy, feigning what one does not experience, and instead concealing what one does—that is, what one really feels and thinks. It was because its ambassadors in Madrid were virtuosos in both dissimulation and simulation that anti-Spanish attitudes remained tacit, boiling up again from time to time, but not resulting in direct confrontation, in which the Republic would be on the losing side if it acted alone.

This in no way altered the fact that in Venice, whether in its command centre in the Doges' Palace or in the mercantile hubbub of the Rialto, antipathy towards Spain was spreading in an explicit way, swelling into a state of hatred. A long-term rift was triggered by the separate peace brokered in 1573 by the Republic with the Empire of the Ottomans, a treaty motivated in part by the need to watch one's back with respect to an infidel ally within the Holy League—Spain—from whom some feared an attack, while Venice was quite ready to pit itself against the Crescent. Better—at the risk of losing

1. Unknown artist, *Order for the Most Serene Republic of Venice to Give the Baton of Command to His Excellency the Navy General*. Engraving, 231 × 153 mm, in *Habiti d'uomini et donne Venetiane con la processione della Ser.ma Signoria et altri particolari, cioè trionfi feste et ceremonie publiche della nobilissima città di Venetia*, by Giacomo Franco (Venice, 1610). London, British Museum.

1 See the entry on Querini in BENZONI (2016), with sources and bibliography.



2. Unknown artist, *Paolo Sarpi*, c. 1613. Oil on canvas, 77 × 65 cm. Oxford, Bodleian Library. Gifted in 1675.

Cyprus—to re-establish merchant shipping on the Venice–Constantinople axis than to be vulnerable, through Milan and Naples, to Spanish pressure. Better to enhance vigilance in the West—strengthened by walls at Bergamo and the fortress-city of Palma, an Eastern sentinel against the Imperial Habsburgs, conniving with Spanish policies—after achieving peace with the Turks than to persist in a state of war with them, in the meantime weakening Venice’s own defensive and reactive capacity with regard to Spanish intentions. Better, in the face of a suffocating Habsburg pincer movement threatening Venice’s freedom and independence, to have peace in the East.

It was at least as early as 1573 that Venice—which had triumphed over the Turk in 1571, at Lepanto, hand in hand with Spain—considered the latter, not the Turk, to be a more dangerous enemy.² And as such, it feared Spain,

detesting it; and hated Spain, being afraid of it. How could it not bear hatred towards the Kingdom? Even the ‘sky’, even ‘nature’ detested ‘how Spain is proceeding’, noted an anonymous Venetian patrician in his early sixteenth-century diary.³ ‘Sancte Turca, libera nos’ from Spanish invasiveness, pleaded Paolo Sarpi (fig. 2) in 1609—he, the *consultore in iure* (expert legal counsel) of the Serenissima, the champion of the Republic’s sovereignty, excommunicated by Rome. ‘None of us—again Sarpi, in 1610—ignores Spain’s animosity towards us’.⁴ Venice was always on its guard with respect to the Catholic Kings, and always vigilant of anyone—in the Senate (the Venetian state’s decision-making body, responsible for both domestic and foreign policy), or in Venice, under some cover or other—suspected of being pro-Spanish. Like the *bailo* Girolamo Lippomano, for example, recalled from his post, arrested and drowned on his way back to Venice in 1591. Or Iseppo Donà, an informer of the Spanish ambassador found negotiating with the Governor of Milan, no less, and therefore hanged on 19 March 1601.⁵ Also hanged, on 18 May 1618, were the handful of presumed Bedmar conspirators (fig. 3).⁶ This was the name of the Spanish ambassador whose overambitious scheming against the Republic provided the Council of Ten with a pretext for pre-emptive action and a recall of the diplomat, who was replaced by another irritatingly hostile envoy.

Yet the Republic had never been under actual threat. For a moment the population believed this, yelling threats as they thronged in front of the Spanish embassy. We should add, though it is more invented than documented, the subsequent narrative of Venice barely avoiding an actual coup; and in 1674 there appeared the fictional *Coniuration des Espagnols contre ... Venise* by César Vichard, Abbé de Saint-Réal—the author whose *Dom Carlos* of 1672 had taken for granted the prince’s love for his stepmother. This last point was later dwelt upon by Thomas Otway, Friedrich Schiller, and Giuseppe Verdi in his musical melodrama, and took a sharp upward swing in the world of theatre with Hugo von Hofmannsthal’s version of Otway’s

2 On the anti-Spanish motivations implied in the 1573 peace with the Turk see BENZONI (2013).

3 See BCMC, cod. Cicogna 1994, Materie politiche, III, fol. 164r.

4 ‘Nemo nostrum ignorat infensum nobis Hispani animum.’ Sarpi’s correspondence—especially the *Lettere ai protestanti* and the *Lettere ai gallicani*—frequently refers to the danger represented by Spain. See SARPI (1931) and SARPI (1961).

5 An outline of both Lippomano and Donà is given by GULLINO (1991) and GULLINO (2005).

6 On which see especially SPINI (1949–50). See also SECO SERRANO (1989) and PRETO (1996).



IN THE SERVICE OF THE AUGUST HOUSE: THE EMBASSY OF THE MARQUESS OF GRANA, IMPERIAL REPRESENTATIVE DURING THE DYNASTIC CRISIS (1641–51)

LUIS TERCERO CASADO

The tension in the air in the royal residence of the Alcázar towards the end of 1648 did not go unnoticed to any of the ambassadors who roamed its corridors. During those chilly November days, the palatial fortress became a highly troubled setting for a man considered a privileged ‘family agent’: the ambassador of the Holy Roman Empire, an ancient and vast territorial conglomerate whose elective crown was then held by the Viennese branch of the House of Habsburg. The daily audiences with the ‘Catholic King’ had become a heavy burden overnight for its representative, the Marquess of Grana, on account of the tense climate of mistrust between the two principal lines of the dynasty. The ministers could barely grasp the immediacy of what was perceived as a blatant ‘betrayal’ by Philip IV’s brother-in-law, Emperor Ferdinand III, of his Spanish relatives. The peace agreement signed unilaterally by the emperor and France at Münster on 24 October put an end to a lengthy war that had begun in 1618. However, peace had come at a high price: Ferdinand III found himself forced to abandon Madrid, Vienna’s natural ally for almost one century, to its own devices¹ and Philip IV was left to face single-handedly the unrelenting attack of an emerging France anxious to take over from the Spanish Monarchy as continental hegemon. The otherwise experienced imperial ambassador was overwhelmed by a situation whose consequences he had not bargained for. His master’s difficult and controversial decision led to the questioning of his capacity as trusted envoy with special privileges.

The imperial ambassador Francesco Antonio del Carretto y Argote, 2nd Marquess of Grana and Count of Millesimo (1594–1651; fig. 1), has sparked somewhat clashing opinions among specialists and contemporaries. Historians such as Grete Mecenseffy, Henri Piquer and Lothar Höbelt all stress the

1. Matthias van Somer, *Francesco Antonio del Carretto, 2nd Marquess of Grana and Count of Millesimo*, c. 1665. Etching in *Ortelius redivivus et continuatus, oder Der Ungarischen Kriegs-Empörungen...*, by Hieronymus Oertel and Martin Meyer (Nuremberg and Frankfurt, 1665, folio). Vienna, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek.

1 On the impact of peace on family ties and a detailed survey of bilateral relations during this period immediately after Westphalia, see TERCERO CASADO (2017).



DIPLOMATIC STAGECRAFT AT THE COURT OF SPAIN: THE 1659 RECEPTION FOR LOUIS XIV'S AMBASSADOR ANTOINE GRAMONT

*Le plus grand éclat et la plus
grande magnificence dont on se
peut aviser en Espagne.¹*

BERTRAND HAAN

The struggle for dominance between the Spanish and French crowns since the early sixteenth century scaled new heights at the peace negotiations of 1659. It influenced events in both military and diplomatic terms, while also subtly shaping the protocol of public events, helping consolidate the image of the two sovereigns.²

Only rarely did the balance of power favour the king of France on such issues. At the end of a conflict whose outcome had long been uncertain, his 1657 alliance with Cromwell gave him the upper hand in military terms. The treaty signed in Paris in May 1659 and then debated afresh at the border in the Pyrenees from 13 August that same year was clearly to his advantage. The marriage of Maria Teresa and Louis XIV was intended to seal the treaty. Protocol dictated that the suitor should ask for the infanta's hand using a diplomat as a go-between. As host, the Spanish camp was in a position to dictate the rules of the game. They seized the opportunity for symbolic revenge, the scope, forms and meaning of which are the focus of the present chapter.

Madrid organised a range of festivities for the arrival of the Duke of Gramont (fig. 1), the French ambassador. The king, the grandees and the court were presented to him along with the capital and royal palaces, in many cases deliberately set up to show them at their most impressive. The event had interesting diplomatic, ceremonial and artistic implications. The celebration of a dynastic union gave the Spaniards and their visitors alike the opportunity to display their mastery of pomp and ceremony, conversation and etiquette, while the Spanish side was also in a position to show off its flair and generosity

1. Attributed to Claude Lefèvre, *Antoine III, Duke of Gramont, Marshal of France and Knight of the Order of the Holy Spirit*, 1665. Oil on canvas, 130 × 100 cm. Gramont Collection, on deposit to the Musée Basque et de l'histoire de Bayonne.

1 Mazarin to Le Tellier, 24 October 1659, BNF-Fr., ms. 4214, fol. 127v.

2 COLOMER (2003).

as host. The sequence of events during the diplomatic mission should not, however, be conflated with readings of the event itself, which changed over time, depending on the relationship between the two monarchies.

A PRESTIGIOUS DIPLOMATIC MISSION

Louis XIV's representative had nothing to negotiate; rather, his mission was part of an elaborate diplomatic game. Philip IV's *valido* Luis de Haro found the terms of the treaty signed in Paris unfair and humiliating, and was aiming for a more equitable agreement; Mazarin was unwell and wanted a quick settlement. For such a symbolic mission to the Spanish king, the ambassador's birth, rank and closeness to the king of France were the key criteria. Finding a candidate who would meet with approval on both sides was a delicate proposition.³

A strict set of criteria

At the Paris negotiations, Mazarin had brought up the name of Eugène-Maurice de Savoie, Count of Soissons, who had ties to the royal families of Savoy and France and to Mazarin himself, having married his niece. As a prince of the blood (*prince du sang*), he had a claim to and indeed held the title of Highness, making him of higher rank than the Spanish grandees. His nomination therefore risked reviving a quarrel over the respective merits of the French and Spanish aristocracies.

Mazarin originally suggested that some way round the problem could be found, but the count's mother, the Princess of Carignano, remained firmly opposed to the idea, citing the example of Thomas of Savoy and his older brother Philibert, Viceroy of Sicily. Mazarin and Hugues de Lionne, who had devoted several years to the negotiations between France and Spain, insisted on maintaining a strict set of criteria, arguing particularly that royal blood flowed in the count's veins.⁴ Haro and Philip IV's Council of State

stoutly defended the prerogatives of the grandees, who systematically downplayed the length and purity of foreign bloodlines. The Marquess of Los Balbases held that Thomas of Savoy had been given special treatment as he was the son of an infanta. Numerous precedents were put forward of foreign princes that the grandees refused to honour.⁵

Mazarin tried to impose the Count of Soissons by initially putting forward several candidates he knew to be unacceptable. In June he suggested the Duke of Guise, who had led the insurgent Republic of Naples in 1647–48. When the two principal ministers met at the border and a matrimonial agreement seemed within reach, on 21 August 1659, Mazarin suggested he should carry out the mission himself. As the king's right-hand man, however, he was considerably over-qualified. He caused even greater consternation when he suggested concluding the marriage without an official proposal. Haro considered Mazarin's suggestions to be nothing more than political manoeuvring.⁶ The intransigence on the French side was tied to the glorification of the royal blood via illegitimate bloodlines after Henri IV; it had already been debated at the Münster congress of 1648, where the Duke of Longueville had asserted his right to the French Crown. In 1659, it was held that an individual who embodied majesty could not be treated informally. There was a clash of two key principles of protocol, social rank and the quality of ambassador, the latter of which won the day.⁷

Mazarin's immediate objective was to go against precedent without losing face, by not following the example of the Duke of Mayenne in asking for Anne of Austria's hand in marriage in 1612.⁸ Haro read Mazarin's mind perfectly and suggested on 26 August that a representative of lesser rank should be appointed, the conditions of the marriage having been decided by then. On 30 August, after talking the matter over with Louis XIV and Anne of Austria, Mazarin suggested choosing a duke and peer, putting Gramont's name forward. He also argued strongly that the diplomatic mission should be relatively low-key and brief, as the

3 SÉRÉ (2007). HANOTIN (2014), pp. 135–50.

4 Pimentel to Haro, 5 and 8 June 1659, AGS, Estado, leg. 1616, nos. 54–55.

5 Haro to Pimentel, 20 May 1659, *ibid.*, no. 50. *Consulta* of the Council of State, 23 June 1659, AGS, Estado, leg. 1619, no. 17. CONIEZ (2009), pp. 65–66.

6 *Consultas* of the Council of State, 23 June, 21, 29 August and 4 September 1659, *ibid.*, nos. 17, 35 and *ibid.*, nos. 36, 47. Haro to Philip IV, 21 August 1659, *ibid.*, leg. 1623, no. 5.

7 COSANDEY (2016), pp. 283–324. MAY (2009).

8 PERRENS (1869), pp. 393–417.

FATHOMING SPANISH ARCANA: THE POLISH AMBASSADOR STANISŁAW MAKOWSKI'S IMPOSSIBLE MISSION TO THE COURT OF PHILIP IV (1638–47)


JAN KIENIEWICZ AND
MATYŁDA URJASZ-RACZKO

The aim of this chapter is to present the world of Spanish politics through the eyes of a diplomatic outsider (fig. 1). What it reveals is an emissary's mental image of the court. He was, moreover, no ordinary envoy but a diplomat who, as we shall argue below, came from a country whose vastly different political culture stemmed from a similarly different hierarchy of values. Yet, at the same time, he became gradually acquainted with the complex world of the Spanish monarchy (the *Monarquía Hispánica* or, as it was called at the time, the *Monarquía Católica*) and the web of relations governing it. This newcomer from a distant land was not a complete stranger, nor did he feel like one. But he was all the same—as will be explained in detail—ill equipped to succeed within Madrid's courtly microcosm. In addition, he was dispatched to press a hopeless case and furthermore lacked the financial means to do so. Indeed, the scholarly consensus is that the diplomatic mission of Stanisław Mąkowski to Spain was unsuccessful.¹ This does not mean, however, that it was also bereft of meaning. Admittedly, the diplomat's political activity, which is known in broad outline, adds little to the history of Spanish politics. Rather, an attempt will be made to gauge the ambassador's ability to unravel the rules governing Philip IV's court, that is, the courtly *modus operandi*: the motives behind decisions as well as the deciding political criteria on which these were purportedly or actually based. The chapter is therefore intended as a study of mutual impressions and not as an analysis of bilateral relations.

In the middle of the seventeenth century, the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth (*res publica* or *Rzeczpospolita*) and Spain were not only geographically distant states, but also widely differing ones. The closer political and trade relations between the two countries before and during the Thirty Years' War

1. *Coat of Arms of Stanisław Mąkowski, Abbot of Lubin*. Etching from *Praxis exigendi pensiones, adversus calumniantes, et differentes illas solvere, partes duæ...*, by Agostinho Barbosa (Lyon, 1643, folio). Madrid, Biblioteca Nacional de España.

1 His mission is extensively referenced by SKOWRON (1997), pp. 146–96, and SKOWRON (2013), pp. 289–313.



2. Tomasz Makowski after Tommaso Dolabella, *The Crown Hetman Stanisław Żółkiewski Presents the Deposed Tsar Vasili IV Ivanovich Shuysky of Russia and His Brothers to King Zygmunt III in the Old Senate Chamber (Sejm) at the Royal Castle in Warsaw on 29 October 1611*, p.q. 1611. Engraving, 235 × 325 mm. Warsaw, Muzeum Narodowe.

did not alter this basic fact. The two countries did not establish broader or more frequent relations such as would have fostered mutual understanding and helped overcome social and cultural barriers.² In conducting political negotiations with the Vasa dynasty, the representatives of the Madrid Habsburg court were aware that the king and the gentry (*szlachta*) were two separate political entities, and that the rulers of the Polish-Lithuanian state had no authority to make binding decisions on international matters. The foreign policy of the *Rzeczpospolita* was in the hands of the *szlachta* sitting in the Parliament (*Sejm*), whose members opposed offensive policies as a matter of principle and were specifically against entering into alliance

with the Habsburgs (fig. 2).³ The Polish-Lithuanian monarchs were one of three ruling bodies endowed with power to decide matters of state. Rulers were subject to state law just as the members of the *szlachta* were.⁴ As a society, the *Rzeczpospolita* was not hierarchised in the same way many western European societies were. The *szlachta*'s self-serving perception of the reason of state was tied to their belief in the importance of upholding their collective rights and freedoms as the cornerstone of the *regnum-mixtum* state system—a view at loggerheads with the place reserved for the sovereign as the indispensable capstone at the apex of the Spanish composite monarchy. The royal court of the *Rzeczpospolita* was not the main centre of power, favour

2 URJASZ-RACZKO (2016).

3 SKOWRON (2003). SKOWRON (2008a).

4 The nineteenth-century historian Joachim Lelewel described the difference in the following terms: 'En España todo pertenecía al monarca [...] En Polonia todo pertenecía a la nobleza'. See KIENIEWICZ (1991), p. 721.



4. Peter Paul Rubens, *Prince Władysław Vasa in Spanish Attire*, 1624. Oil on canvas, 125.1 × 101 cm. Cracow, Wawel Castle / Zamek Królewski na Wawelu.



‘QUESTO NON BASTA A CONTENTAR UNA DONNA SPAGNOLA’: CAMILLO MASSIMO AS PAPAL NUNCIO IN MADRID AND HIS LATER TIES TO SPAIN (1655–62)

LISA BEAVEN AND
JOSÉ LUIS COLOMER

The exceptional contribution to Italian Seicento culture made by Camillo Massimo (1620–1677) is well established among art historians of this period. A scion of one of Rome’s oldest and most prominent families, he combined his career as a high-ranking official of the Papal court with a wide range of intellectual interests, which he ardently pursued, becoming an esteemed antiquarian collector and a close friend of influential tastemakers like Francesco Angeloni and Giovanni Pietro Bellori, as well as a patron of contemporary artists including Nicolas Poussin, Claude Lorrain and Carlo Maratti.¹ A rising star of Innocent X’s hispanophile court, Massimo also befriended Diego Velázquez and sat for him wearing the bright blue costume of *cameriere segreto* in one of the memorable portraits made by the Spaniard during his second visit to Rome in 1649, when Philip IV gave him leave to seek appropriate paintings and sculptures for the refurbishment of Madrid’s Alcázar (fig. 1).²

Massimo’s ties to Velázquez and to Spain would be maintained: continuing his fast track in the church hierarchy—*chierico della Camera Apostolica* in 1651, Patriarch of Jerusalem in 1653—he was made papal nuncio to Madrid in 1654, a suitable appointment for the then head of a family whose members had been serving the political and military interests of the Spanish monarchy for decades.³ The prestige and importance of such a post within the diplomacy of the Holy See usually ensured elevation to the purple, even the papacy—both Innocent X Pamphilj and the future Clement IX, Giulio Rospigliosi,

1. Diego Velázquez, *Camillo Massimo*, 1649–50. Oil on canvas, 74.5 × 59.5 cm. Kingston Lacy, Dorset, The National Trust.

1 HASKELL (1963/1989). POMPONI (1996). GARDNER COATES (1998). TERRIBILE (2008). BEAVEN (2010).

2 PALOMINO (1715–24/1988), vol. 3, ‘Vida de Velázquez’, ch. 5. COLOMER (2003). The portrait was identified by HARRIS (1958).

3 DI CARPEGNA FALCONIERI (1996), p. 31.



10a. Carlo Maratta, *Giovanni Pietro Bellori*, c. 1670.
Oil on canvas, 97 × 72.5 cm. Private collection.



10b. Title page to *Le vite de' pittori, scultori et architetti moderni*, by Giovanni Pietro Bellori (Rome, 1672).

demonstrated loyalty to the disgraced prelate, who relied on him for news, erudite reading material, gems, prints, coins and statues. An intense correspondence reveals how much the friendship they had founded on their shared reverence for classical antiquity deepened when Massimo faced a setback in his career and Bellori became his closest contact.⁵⁹

DEALINGS WITH A SPANISH LADY AND MATTERS OF TASTE

Massimo involved Bellori and the people who had been part of his household in Spain as middlemen in a most unusual transaction between Madrid and Rome, as he set out to buy Lorenzo Ramírez de Prado's collection of

ancient coins and medals. His Spanish friend had died, aged seventy-five, shortly after Massimo's homeward journey in 1658, so Massimo asked Giacomo Fantuzzi and Antonio Maria Antonozzi to negotiate from the *nunziatura* with Lorenzo's widow, Doña Lorenza de Cárdenas.

The descendant of a long line of Castilian nobles, Doña Lorenza had gone against her family's wishes in 1639 when she married her second husband Ramírez de Prado, whose meteoric rise to the upper echelons of the state never entirely quashed the suspicions about his ancestors' *converso* origins.⁶⁰ Despite being an unequal match, the marriage lasted happily for nearly twenty years; after his death, as a childless widow she devoted her remaining two decades to single-handedly running numerous charitable works and

59 AM, vol. (or *prot.*) 276 (*Registro II*) contains Massimo's letters from 1658 to 1663, the period in which he was exiled in Roccasecca dei Volsci. A selection of passages from this correspondence is transcribed in the documentary Appendix to this chapter.

60 Beginning with various privileges granted by Philip III, Lorenzo Ramírez de Prado's long and brilliant career continued during the reign of Philip IV, who sent him to France in 1628 as ambassador extraordinary to Louis XIII in the context of the War of the Mantuan Succession

ACROSS CONFESSIONAL BORDERS:
AMBASSADORS FROM THE NORTH



CROSS-CONFESSIONAL AND DIPLOMATIC INCIDENTS: DUTCH AMBASSADORS IN MADRID (1648–72)

MAURITS EBBEN

Hendrick van Reede van Renswoude, ambassador of the States General to Spain, passed away on 19 September 1669. He had been the first official representative in Madrid of the High and Mighty Lords States General after Philip IV concluded peace with the Dutch Protestant rebels in Münster in 1648 and recognised the Republic of the United Provinces as an independent and sovereign state (fig. 1). Shortly before his death, Van Reede van Renswoude had converted to Catholicism, and his funeral, paid for by the Spanish Crown, was a triumph of Catholic pomp and circumstance. The States General might well have considered this spectacular and officially sponsored ceremony to be deeply offensive. Quite frequently, less serious diplomatic incidents were blown out of proportion, leading to cooler relations between countries, putting contacts on hold or even causing a more consequential political rift. At times, the discrepancy between a seemingly insignificant event and its international repercussions defied comprehension or even description.¹ Diplomatic incidents could be at the source of conflicts between states and monarchs, but could also be provoked deliberately in order to pursue certain political goals. Yet, diplomacy, as it had developed in early modern Europe, also provided tools for avoiding an escalation of unpleasant episodes.² If the public honour and dignity of a country were not at stake, the incident could be brushed aside, or else apologies could be demanded and offered, for instance by means of an embassy, in a specially designed reconciliation ceremony or through the conduct of negotiations.

Several diplomatic incidents that occurred between the Republic and Spain will be analysed in this chapter, as well as the ways in which both sides sought to neutralise them. The two countries, despite their long-standing hostilities and religious differences, maintained remarkably good relations in the second

1. Attributed to Bartholomeus van Bassen and Anthonie Palamedesz, *The Ridderzaal of the Binnenhof in The Hague, during the Great Assembly of the States General in 1651* (detail of fig. 13), c. 1651. Oil on panel and copper, 52 × 66 cm. The Hague, Mauritshuis, on loan to the Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam.

1 BÉLY AND POUMARÈDE (2010), pp. 455–58. RICHES (2012).

2 BÉLY (2007), pp. 15–23. SCHILLING (2007), pp. 120–90. BLACK (2010), pp. 76–80.

half of the seventeenth century and averted the danger of letting protocol squabbles develop into thorny disputes. Such an appeasing attitude is consonant with the international state of affairs after the Peace of Münster. To be sure, neither of the two powers could afford an escalation of diplomatic incidents into serious conflict. In keeping with the focus of this volume on Madrid, the analysis will be limited to events occurring at the Spanish court. Moreover, in accordance with the book's emphasis on performative and material aspects of early modern diplomacy, it will concentrate on the ceremonial trappings and the working conditions of Dutch diplomats in the Spanish capital and particularly on those of Van Reede van Renswoude, for which purpose the post-mortem inventory of his residence will be studied.

SPANISH–DUTCH RELATIONS AND THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT

The 1648 Peace of Westphalia had allowed Spain to close the war front in the north. Its leaders had also been hoping that the Republic would become their ally, not only to protect the Southern Netherlands but also to supply funds and military equipment in the struggle against France and England. Dutch financiers were willing to lend money to the Spanish Crown and, with the consent of the government, businessmen provided weapons and shipbuilding materials for the armadas. But the Dutch were not willing to make a military and political commitment. Grand Pensionary Johan de Witt (fig. 2), the Republic's most powerful politician between 1653 and 1672, believed that a rapprochement or commitment vis-à-vis Madrid would spur the French to invade and annex Spain's possessions in the Low Countries. Despite Madrid's insistence on the need for a common strategy to defend the Spanish Netherlands—especially because the English, too, saw opportunities to occupy Flemish ports—the realisation that De Witt did not even wish to appear genuinely interested came as a surprise to the Spanish. Louis XIV never concealed his irritation whenever De Witt alluded to a potential collaboration with the Spanish Habsburgs to protect the Southern Netherlands. At the very most, the Grand Pensionary would hint at such Hispano–Dutch cooperation to let



2. Copy after Jan de Baen, *Grand Pensionary Johan de Witt with the Assembly Hall of the States of Holland on the Right*, c. 1643–1700. Oil on canvas, 125 × 98 cm. Amsterdam, Rijksmuseum.

Louis XIV know that he would not tolerate a French occupation or annexation. In truth, De Witt did not entertain any hopes of entering into a military alliance with Spain and believed that Louis XIV's territorial ambitions south of the Dutch border could be held in check by means of an arrangement with the French monarch that would discourage the recourse to force.³

Yet the Republic was hardly in a position to set little store by preserving its good relations with Spain. The closure of the Scheldt and the blockade of the Flemish coast through a policy of tariffs were preconditions for continued Dutch success in trade and industry. Maintaining the favourable status quo agreed upon at Münster, which included Philip IV's control over the Catholic Low Countries, was of paramount importance for the safeguarding of Dutch interests. Louis XIV's proposals to divide up this territory

3 CARTER (1975), pp. 7–18. ISRAEL (1982), pp. 375–441. EBBEN (2002).



SIR RICHARD FANSHAWE: THE RESTORATION TRAGEDY OF A CAVALIER AESTHETE

PIERS BAKER-BATES
AND ALISTAIR MALCOLM

Sir Richard Fanshawe remains in many ways the forgotten man of the Cavalier court (fig. 1). He has attracted interest principally for being the husband of Ann Fanshawe, whose memoirs of their life together have become a classic source for gender historians. Yet, Ann's recollections, which were written down many years after the event, have been largely responsible for the rather insipid image that we currently have of Richard as a trusty friend, loyal public servant and loving husband—an image that was certainly not shared by his fellow diplomats, nor by the judicial authorities of Madrid.¹ In fact, serious research on Fanshawe has been concentrated almost exclusively on his work as a poet and translator. This essay will present him as someone who is worthy of attention, not just as a literary figure, but also for the part that he played in a wider sense as a cultural bridge between England and the Iberian world. Above all, it will be suggested that he was an ambitious man whose family background and early career at the time of the civil wars had placed him at the heart of the royalist establishment, and on close terms with Charles II. The failure of his hopes for high office following the Stuart Restoration in 1660 would lead him to take increasingly desperate measures to regain the confidence of the king, measures that would ultimately bring about his undoing. Let us begin, though, at the moment when his career appeared to have reached its zenith.

1. William Dobson, *Sir Richard Fanshawe*, c. 1644–46. Oil on canvas, 133 × 105 cm. London, Borough of Barking and Dagenham, Valence House.

Besides the editors of this volume, the authors would like to thank María Castañeda, Peter Davidson, Andrew Hegarty, Todd Longstaffe-Gowan, Deirdre Marculescu, Laura Oliván Santaliestra, Clare Sexton, Alan Thomson, Felipe Vidales, LeeAnne Westwood and the research seminar groups of the Departments of History at the Universidade Nova of Lisbon and the Universidad Pablo de Olavide of Seville.

1 The more complex side to Fanshawe's personality that will be presented in this essay has occasionally been hinted at by scholars. See STRADLING (1968), p. 390 (n. 114), FEILING (1968), pp. 169–70, and DAVIES (1977), pp. 99–100.



6. Unknown artist, *Somerset House Conference*, 1604. Oil on canvas, 205.5 × 277 cm. London, National Maritime Museum.

**'DELIGHT IN WITTIE AND INGENIOUS THINGS':
SIR RICHARD AS PATRON OF THE ARTS**

An attempt by Fanshawe at self-fashioning in his diplomatic role can be seen in another commission with which he has tentatively connected, although here we must be more speculative. Sir Richard's name has long been associated with a copy of the *Somerset House Conference*, a painting of which two versions exist (fig. 6 and pp. 12–13). The date and author of these two remain much disputed, arguments which it is not our intention to enter into here.¹⁰⁹ What is of interest is a document of 1681 that refers to a copy of

this painting having been in the possession of Sir Richard Fanshawe. Francis Parry, a former ambassador to Portugal who had known Sir Richard personally, brought a version of the work back to England with him. He writes to Sir Robert Southwell, his own predecessor at Lisbon, that 'you saw a copy of the picture at Sir Richard Fanshawe's at Madrid; the design of the picture is a *junta* of five of Queen Elizabeth's counsellors sitting at the table with six of the King of Spains'.¹¹⁰ This is unlikely to be the version in the National Portrait Gallery, that was acquired at the Hamilton Sale in 1882, but could be the contemporary copy that is now in the National Maritime Museum in London.

109 STRONG (1969), vol. 1, pp. 351–53. UNGERER (1998). BROWN AND ELLIOTT (2002), pp. 144–46. HEARN (2004).

110 STRONG (1969), vol. 1, p. 353.

‘FASHIONING’ SIR ARTHUR HOPTON

I am delighted that you ask me so insistently for my portrait:
such signs breathe your lovely and long-known affection for me,
and I am sad only that you ask me such little things so hesitantly:
even if there were not a true and perfect friendship between us
(which outshines all common courtesies as the Sun dims lesser lights),
I have received so much from you that you can demand of me
far greater things by simple right. As soon as I go back to Venice
I will have it done either by Paolo Veronese or by Tintoretto,
who at the moment are easily the first in that art.

Philip Sidney to Hubert Languet
Padua, 4 February 1574

TODD LONGSTAFFE-GOWAN

Sir Arthur Hopton (1588?–1650; fig. 1) was appointed secretary to the embassy of Sir Francis Cottington in Spain in 1629, and acquired a reputation for shrewdness not only as a diplomat but also for his activities as a collector, on behalf of Charles I and members of the Whitehall Group. He was described by Cottington as having ‘the kinges good opinion in a very large measure, & farr beionde any man hee hath lately employed abroad’. John Evelyn, who knew him well, regarded him as a ‘most excellent person’,¹ and the poet and politician Edmund Waller praised him as ‘a very worthy person’ and one who ‘is not only a wise person in generall but most practically expert in the business of Spayne’.²

Like Sir Philip Sidney in the epigraph above, Hopton showed an interest in commissioning portraits of himself, of a kind that he envisaged as works of art in their own right, worthy of a place in his collection for qualities that transcend their role of defining and affirming his identity. Three portraits of him, by three different artists, survive; each successive image becomes increasingly ambitious and iconographically complex. The period in which this group of paintings was produced (c. 1638–41) corresponds with the diplomat’s metamorphosis from resident agent to knight and ultimately to ambassador to the court of King Philip IV of Spain.

Much has been written about Hopton as an enlightened connoisseur and his role as a cultural broker.³ There has, however, been little interest in exploring

1. Unknown artist, *Sir Arthur Hopton* (detail of fig. 8, *Sir Arthur Hopton and His Brother Sir Thomas Hopton*), c. 1638. Oil on canvas, 115 × 134 cm. England, private collection.

I am grateful to Chloe Chard, José Luis Colomer, Jorge Fernández-Santos, Piers Baker-Bates, Alistair Malcolm, Amalia Descalzo, Susan Bracken and Alex Bell for their generous and informed input.

1 BRAY (1906), vol. 2, p. 5: entry of 7 June 1649.

2 BL, Add Ms. 78315 (Evelyn papers—John Evelyn’s correspondence), fol. 103: Edmund Waller to John Evelyn, Rouen, 14 August 1647. Ibid., fol. 76: Edmund Waller to John Evelyn, Rouen, 17 August 1647.

3 TRAPIER (1967). BROWN AND ELLIOTT (2002), pp. 33, 37, 40, 42, 53–58, 74, 83, 90, 91, 174, 206–09, 213, 216, 217, 229.

his rich personal iconography. This chapter takes the portraits as its primary point of reference for an exploration of the various ways in which he envisaged his career as a diplomat and collector, constantly engaged in managing cross-cultural encounters and, as his correspondence demonstrates, strongly aware of the network of other practices with which the viewing and collecting of art became entangled. Although the tradition of British ambassadors having their likenesses painted was by this time reasonably well established, few individuals took such a personal and sustained interest in using portraiture as a mechanism for projecting themselves in their career.⁴ The portraits of Hopton tell us a great deal about his conscious and measured efforts to fashion himself as a ‘Compleat Gentleman’—a loyal, informed and educated courtier in the service of the Crown, and a noble representative of the kingdom in foreign parts.

EDUCATION, DIPLOMACY AND COLLECTING

Sir Arthur Hopton was born c. 1588, the fifth son of Sir Arthur Hopton of Witham Friary, Somerset.⁵ Privately educated, he matriculated at Lincoln College, Oxford, on 15 March 1604/05, and was admitted to the Honourable Society of the Middle Temple on 11 November 1609, where he remained until 11 February 1620.⁶ After this, very little is known of him until 1629, when he travelled to Spain as secretary to Sir Francis Cottington, the then newly appointed ambassador extraordinary (fig. 2).⁷ Hopton appears, however, to have had an interest in Spanish affairs from the early 1620s as his ‘true friend’ the historian and political writer James Howell wrote to him from Madrid on 5 January 1622/23 to report that the ‘treaty of the match twixt our Prince [Charles] and the Lady Infanta is now strongly a foot’, describing the fair complexions of both this princess and the king and the contrasting ‘*Spanish* hue’ of their brother Don Carlos.⁸



2. Wenceslaus Hollar, *Sir Francis Cottington, Lord Cottington of Hanworth*, c. 1632–44. Etching, 86 × 65 mm. London, British Museum.

After his appointment as secretary to Cottington’s embassy, Hopton readily adapted to the Spanish way of life, and his fluency in speaking and writing Castilian made him popular and influential at court. Although we are concerned here primarily with his role as a cultural broker and a purveyor of works of art, the activities he carried out in this regard, although considered part of the normal currency of exchange and competition between the European courts, were secondary to his official duties.⁹ His responsibilities as resident agent (after Cottington’s departure in 1631)

4 Sir Henry Wotton had his portrait painted in 1620 to mark his appointment as ambassador extraordinary to the Venetian Republic; Charles Cornwallis, who was resident ambassador to Spain (1605–09), was painted by Robert Peake the Elder in c. 1610; and John Digby, 1st Earl of Bristol, was portrayed in a line engraving published by William Peake as ‘Embassador extraordinary to the high and Mightie Philip the fourth’.

5 Sir Arthur (c. 1588) is sometimes referred to as Sir Arthur II, and his father as Sir Arthur I.

6 MARTIN (1905), pp. 513, 577, 600, 645. Until the eighteenth century, the majority of students at the Middle Temple were the sons of country gentry who attended the Inns of Court as ‘finishing school’ rather than as intending barristers. The Inns provided a form of general education, including the art of dance, as well as legal training, and also enabled students to cultivate advantageous contacts.

7 See the entry on Sir Arthur Hopton in LOOMIE (2004).

8 HOWELL (1650), p. 51.

9 ELLIOTT (2009), p. 271. See also COLOMER (2003). The purchase and distribution of art, books and luxury items, whether in the form of orders placed, diplomatic gifts or tradable commodities, was an unofficial yet integral part of contemporary diplomacy.



THE CULTIVATED NEGOTIATOR: CORNELIUS LERCHE'S MISSIONS IN MADRID (1650–55, 1658–62)

ENRIQUE CORREDERA NILSSON

In April 1663, Cornelius Pedersen Lerche (fig. 1),¹ who had recently returned home from a stint as Frederick III's representative in Madrid (fig. 2), wrote a report on the relations between Denmark and the Spanish monarchy.² The report, which dwelled primarily on the global state of affairs between both powers, included certain passages focusing on key individuals. The Duke of Medina de las Torres, then one of the most influential courtiers, was identified as a 'generous prince' (*generøus Første*).³ Lerche pointed out that Medina liked to receive gifts such as amber rosaries and crucifixes.⁴ After Luis de Haro's passing in 1661, the Duke of Medina was acknowledged as a highly influential nobleman at the Habsburg court, and it was understood that any diplomat was well advised to win him over.⁵ Medina was not the only individual who attracted Cornelius Lerche's attention: a much less known figure, Manuel Pantoja y Alpuche, was singled out as someone who had to be conveniently flattered if Danish interests in Spain were to be adroitly served. Lerche's comments on these two men were anything but offhand. By 1663 Cornelius Lerche was experienced enough to be able to spot the most useful information for his sovereign—to whom the report was addressed. Lerche was well aware that interpersonal relations were often key to 'global politics', and that 'doing diplomacy' in mid-seventeenth century Europe meant unravelling the personal allegiances and the often hidden mechanisms that kept a foreign court running.⁶ Diplomatic missions, which were complex activities unto themselves, help unveil much about Europe's courtly

1. José Antolínez, *Ambassador Cornelius Pedersen Lerche and His Staff* (detail of fig. 13), 1662. Oil on canvas, 186.5 × 215.8 cm. Copenhagen, Statens Museum for Kunst.

1 Several spellings are found for Cornelius Pedersen Lerche's surname: Lerche, Lercke, Lerque or Lerke. Following the *Dansk Biografisk Leksikon*, we will use 'Lerche', which is also the most frequently quoted.

2 KB, GKS, 2715 quarto Memorandum by Cornelius Lerche, dated 9 April 1663.

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid.

5 On Medina de las Torres, see STRADLING (1976) and MARTÍNEZ HERNÁNDEZ (2016). I wish to thank Santiago Martínez for kindly providing a copy of his article.

6 VON THIESSEN (2010a). VON THIESSEN (2010b).



2. Abraham Wuchters, *Frederick III, King of Denmark and Norway*, 1657. Oil on panel, 52.5 × 39.5 cm. Copenhagen, Statens Museum for Kunst.

world behind the scenes. Studying Cornelius Pedersen Lerche's two missions in Madrid (1650–55 and 1658–62) provides an insight into this world in general and into the political, social and cultural life of Philip IV's court in particular, as well as its links with the rest of the continent.

THE EARLY MODERN COURT AND DIPLOMACY IN THE BAROQUE AGE

In order to best explore what Cornelius Lerche's missions tell us about Philip IV's court, some brief comments are due on the nature of the early modern court and the place foreign dignitaries occupied in it. The court was a complex social organisation in which the foreign diplomat was both a par-

ticipant and an observer—one whose aims were unlike those of the 'regular courtier'. As a social organisation, the court perpetuated the nobility's grip on power, ensuring courtiers had privileged access to plentiful resources ranging from economic to symbolic.⁷ It also became the centre of a burgeoning bureaucratic apparatus designed to serve the interests of the sovereign and the ruling elite, spawning increasingly complex forms of statehood.⁸ In this sense, the court as an organisation combined—not without contradictions and conflicts—stratified or hierarchical and functional or operative means of differentiation.⁹ Even if foreign diplomats chose to further their own agenda at the expense of their ruler's, the conduct of diplomacy required them to behave as courtiers and adapt to the makeup of the foreign court to which they had been posted. The complexity of the early modern court was not only functional but also spatial and material. Prized objects in circulation and placement at court functions defined a visible and even tangible hierarchy. Madrid was the main stage where Philip IV's court displayed itself and where courtiers and diplomats resided and interacted—not just at the royal palace, but all around the city. Members of the court often showcased their elite status through objects, be they clothes, books or artworks. Last but not least, European courts were collective entities and kept watch on each other from a distance, with ambassadors and diplomatic agents acting as the eyes and ears of their rulers and governments and of their respective courts. A broad range of information was passed on, not only by letter but also by means of refined or exclusive objects that were dispatched or taken back home by returning diplomats and which spoke of the material culture of foreign courts. In short, objects as well as processes help tell the story of the early modern court, and both are key to grasping what Lerche's missions reveal about Philip IV's court in its final fifteen years.

PHILIP IV'S COURT AS SEEN THROUGH LERCHE'S MISSIONS

Cornelius Pedersen Lerche resided in Madrid first between 1651 and 1655 and again between 1659 and 1662.¹⁰ Focusing on military setbacks and the Crown's budgetary

7 HENGERER (2004), p. 11. SCHLÖGL (2014), p. 255.

8 SCHLÖGL (2014), p. 251.

9 SCHLÖGL (2014), p. 250.

10 There was a substantial difference between the date of appointment and the actual date of arrival in Madrid. While the exact dates of arrival and departure cannot be ascertained, available documentation helps set chronological limits. Since Lerche's first instruction was dated



REPORTING BACK TO THE ‘PHOENIX OF SO MANY CENTURIES’: MATHIAS PALBITZKI, QUEEN CHRISTINA’S ENVOY TO SPAIN (1651–52)

HANS HELANDER
AND MARTIN OLIN

A sudden and surprising change in the relations between Spain and Sweden took place in 1650. After the Peace of Westphalia, European statesmen carefully reconsidered old animosities or alliances, and the sovereigns of the kingdoms of Sweden and Spain—distant from each other not only geographically but also in terms of religion, politics and culture—now realised that a closer relationship might in fact be mutually beneficial.¹ This essay will discuss the Swedish embassy to Madrid in 1651–52, its background and its consequences. The years between the conclusion of the Thirty Years’ War in 1648 and the abdication of Queen Christina in 1654 have been the subject of intense study. Many scholars have scrutinised the events leading up to the abdication and subsequent conversion of the young monarch, but it has not been possible to reach a consensus on the underlying reasons for her dramatic renouncement of both throne and faith. Queen Christina was a master of dissimulation and always made sure no one ever divined her ultimate objectives. The careful assessment of extant sources has therefore been of the greatest importance. The historian Curt Weibull noted that, despite the abundance of sources on every aspect of the queen’s life, when it came to ascertaining the true motives steering events, this plethora of information, consisting mostly of gossip, biased accounts or conventional praise, proved largely ‘worthless’.²

Weibull, a champion of the principles of source criticism, maintained that the view of Christina and her life gleaned from an indiscriminate reading of the sources was, and could only be, inconsistent. Although perfectly aware that biased sources could and did prove valuable, he was no doubt right. The

1. David Klöcker Ehrenstrahl, *Mathias Palbitzki*, 1665. Oil on canvas, 133 × 112 cm. Tagel, Rappe-von Schmitterlöwska.

Martin Olin is responsible for the first and last sections of the chapter. The central section (‘Palbitzki reports to Queen Christina’) is Hans Helander’s.

1 See PI CORRALES (2012). A recent contribution by CORREDERA NILSSON (2016) covers specifically bilateral relations between Sweden and Spain in 1648–60.

2 WEIBULL (1931/1961), preface, p. 7. On unflattering gossip about Christina circulating in Madrid at the time, see ARELLANO (2016).



10. Vicente Carducho, *The Expulsion of the Moriscos*, c. 1627. Ink, pencil and blue wash on paper, 380 × 504 mm. Madrid, Museo Nacional del Prado.

and Andalusia.⁷⁶ Thus Spain could be said to be hampered by its lack of uniformity, being as it was a conglomerate of former kingdoms holding on to their own customs, legal system and administration.⁷⁷ Christina would easily realise the extent to which its diverse constitutional structure weakened the Spanish Empire.⁷⁸ Spain's various realms made use of the Crown's income to their own advantage, often to enhance and display their own renown and glory,

common resources being squandered as a result. The administrative apparatus was extensive: there were as many 'senates'⁷⁹ as there were former kingdoms, not to mention presidencies, chambers, chancelleries and tribunals beyond count.⁸⁰ The already innumerable and continuously increasing administrative posts generated by this system were up for sale (*venalia*), with all available resources being devoured by a gargantuan bureaucracy that kept a tight

76 In point of fact, only the Nasrid kingdom of Granada was conquered by Ferdinand and Isabella. The other territories mentioned by Palbitzki had been seized by Christian rulers well ahead of the final phase of the *Reconquista*.

77 For a broad-based comparison between Sweden and Spain in the seventeenth century see MÖRNER (1998).

78 '[...] non exiguum debilitatem hinc Imperio Hispanico nasci viderit'.

79 The word *senatus* here refers to *cortes*.

80 'Tot senatus fere quod Regna, Praesidentias vero, cameras, Cancellarias et Tribunalia quis enumeret'.

SMALL ITALIAN STATES
AND THE SUBLIME PORTE



‘THE WEALTHIEST AND MOST LEARNED GENTLEMAN OF THAT REPUBLIC’: THE EMBASSY OF ANTON GIULIO BRIGNOLE-SALE IN MADRID (1644–46)

PIERO BOCCARDO

Among the thirty or so individuals who represented the Republic of Genoa in Madrid during the reign of Philip IV (1621–65)—varied in their roles and diplomatic tasks, and ranging from resident gentlemen and *incaricati* to veritable ambassadors, both ordinary and extraordinary—a truly outstanding figure for both his personal qualities and fame was Anton Giulio Brignole-Sale (1605–1662; fig. 1), an exact contemporary of the Spanish sovereign. Suffice it to recall that his mission to the court of the *Rey Planeta* or Planet King between June 1644 and August 1646 was only one of many significant achievements during a not very long but full life, remarkable for his political activity but above all for his notable literary output. In the still fundamental monograph on this Genoese gentleman, written over a century ago by Michele De Marinis, an entire chapter is dedicated to that ambassadorial appointment,¹ but—based as it was exclusively on the correspondence between Brignole-Sale and the government of the Republic—the account only addresses the motivations, fulfilment and consequences of his task. Research carried out for the present text, drawing from archives in Spain and elsewhere relating to those two years, allows us to add a wealth of information, indeed leading us to believe that our protagonist’s experiences in Spain, in all its aspects (sometimes dramatic), played a part in his subsequent decision, in the year his wife died (1648), to abandon worldly existence and embrace religious life.

1. Anthony van Dyck, *Equestrian Portrait of Anton Giulio Brignole-Sale* (see pendant, fig. 3), 1627. Oil on canvas, 282 × 198 cm. Genoa, Palazzo Rosso. Musei di Strada Nuova.

1 DE MARINIS (1914), pp. 249–62. For his diplomatic mission, see also COSTANTINI (1986), especially pp. 335–36; and GALLO TOMASINELLI (1994), pp. 3–32; as regards the individual it is worth reading DE CARO (1972).



3. Anthony van Dyck, *Paola Adorno Brignole-Sale* (see pendant, fig. 1), 1627. Oil on canvas, 282 × 151 cm. Genoa, Palazzo Rosso. Musei di Strada Nuova.



ON THE TRANSLATABILITY OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERIES: GALILEO, MEDICEAN DIPLOMACY AND THE SPANISH COURT (1612–32)

PAOLA VOLPINI

PROFILES IN EARLY SEICENTO CULTURAL AGENCY BETWEEN MADRID AND FLORENCE

This chapter will address the story of the negotiations between Galileo Galilei (fig. 1) and the court in Madrid as attempts were made to have the Spanish navy adopt the method he had ‘discovered’ for measuring marine longitudes. These dealings lasted for years and involved the active diplomacy of the Medici at the court of the ‘Catholic King’. We shall consider modes of contact and how Galileo put forward some of his inventions, and how cultural and scholarly communication functioned between the Tuscan scientist and those responsible for politics and culture at the Spanish court. This case study, in both its means and limitations, thus allows us to analyse the role of diplomacy in scientific communication, a subject that has been little studied but remains open to in-depth approaches. In this respect it is important to study some of the individuals who played the role of ‘intermediaries’ between the two sides, paying special attention to the curiosities and cultural stimuli of those involved in diplomacy (whether agents, envoys or ambassadors, both ordinary and extraordinary)—individuals who could play a role in cultural mediation, not always carried out with planned or explicit purpose, but often effective in facilitating the circulation and exchange of information.¹ The background of our discourse is defined by the broader and more personal and scientific outline of Galileo, which at certain points obviously comes to the fore.

Before concretely presenting the story and its implications, we cannot omit some of the remarks on the rich historiographical context in which this can be

1. Ottavio Leoni, *Galileo Galilei*, 1624. Black pencil, sanguine and white chalk on blue paper, 237 × 165 mm. Florence, Biblioteca Marucelliana.


I should like to thank Federica Farino and Maria Antonietta Visceglia for reading this essay and offering stimulating commentary. Elisabetta Stumpo kindly located and identified the medal representing Giuliano de’ Medici di Catellina (fig. 13) and provided much appreciated support with iconographic research.

1 VisCEGLIA (2015), p. 10.

R E G N I

ET STATI DEL RE FILIPPO, ET

DEL GRAN TVRCO CON LE LORO ENTRATE, ET SPESE, ET ALTRE COSE NOTABILI


Nell'Africa il Rè Catholico ha

Il Regno d'Orano, con la superiorità del Regno di Tunis.
Fuori dello stretto di Gibilterra.
L'Isola Canarie, & il Perù diuiso in molti Regni.

In Europa

La Spagna, che comprende i Regni, di Castiglia, Toledo, Lione, Granata, Andulogia, Biscaglia, Nauarra, Gallatia, Aragon, Valentia, Catalogna, l'Isola Maiorica, & Minorica.
La Contea di Borgogna.

Tre Signorie; cioè, la Frisia, & Ourisiel, Malines.

Quattro Ducati, che sono Brabantia, Limburg, Lecemburg, & Gheldria.

Sei contadi ne' paesi, bassi che sono la Fiandra, Namur, Artois, Hanonia, Olanda & Zelanda.

Nell'Italia.

Il Regno di Napoli, di Sicilia, di Sardegna, & lo stato di Milano.

Quelli, che più de gli altri sono pratici particolarmente delle cose de gli stati & de' Principi, dicono che questi duo gran Principi hanno intorno le infrastrate entrate.

Caua il Rè Catholico.

Delli Datij di Castiglia, & de gli assignamenti di Carlo quinto all'Imperatrice, vn milion d'oro, & 560. milia ducati.

Di Siuiglia, & dell'entrate dello Almozarisfago maggiore, & delli dritti delle mercantie diuerse cinquecento milia ducati.

Delle Sete di Granata cento milia ducati.

De' Porti secchi sessanta milia ducati.

Del seruitio Montago 45. milia

Del Sale 265. milia.

Entrate diuerse gli rendono 65. milia ducati.

Quella che si chiama Farda trentacinque milia

Gli dritti delle Mercantie di Portugallo cento milia.

Il Seruitio ordinario, & straordinario de' Regni di Spagna 400. milia.

Merci, ch'escono di Spagna, delle lane cento milia.

Le contributioni de' Mercanti che trafficano nell'Indie 55. milia.

Le minere de' Regni 265. milia.

Di Catalogna, Valenza, Aragon per lo seruitio delle corti di Monzon 44. Milia

Gli dritti delle Mercantie d'Orano gli danno 5. milia.

Le merci che vengono di Fiandra, d'Inghilterra, & di Francia 80. milia

Litre Macfrati, di Santyago Alcantera, & Calatraua 235. milia

L'erbe del campo di Calatraua, & d'altri luoghi 95. milia.

L'Indie vn'anno per l'altro rendongli 400. milia ducati.

Altri ajuti, & sussidi 400. milia.

De' bacfi bassi caua vn milion d'oro

Di Napoli vn'altro milione 300. milia ducati cōpreso il donatuo d'ogni 3. anni.

Di Milano vn'altro milione.

Di Sicilia più di mezzo milione, &

Di Sardegna 100. milia ducati.

Tutta questa entrata somma Milioni otto, & 709. milia ducati.

La spesa di Sua M.C. è intorno à 6. milioni d'oro, di modo che s'ella non fosse per le fouerchie spese fatte nelle guerre passate, di debiti aggravata, auuarebbe ageuolmente intorno à due milioni d'oro & più l'anno.


Le fortezze del suo Imperio sono in maggior numero, & più sicure di quelle del Turco

Soldati da-i pagati sono ordinariamente 20. milia, & volendone, più di cento milia ne può fare ne gli stati suoi.

Caualleria ha quanto le sia bisogno, & se più ne volesse, più ne hauerebbe, & di maggior valor della Turchesca, si come fanno quelli, che dell'vna, & l'altra insieme azzuffate anno più volte veduta la sperienza.

Galee armate ha più di 40. & se vuole ne può fare fino al nu. di 200. & più: ne ciurme le mae. & buoni addoperando i debiti mezi, & modi conuenienti

Hor chi cōsidera giudicialmente quanto è notato in questo Foglio, e non vede chiara mente il Rè Cesser per lo più superiore al Turco? Resta solo pregare il magno Iddio, che col mezzo della te. ta de' Ministri, Governatori, Capitani, & altri gli porga aiuto di opprimerlo, & stirpare del tutto quella nefanda legge per cagion della quale ne vanno tanti, anti dannati all'altra vita, ond'egli solo in ogni loco sia, con i giusto, conosciu. & adorato.


Nell'Africa ha il Turco

Algieri, & Tripoli.

In Europa

La Romania, che comprende.

La Grecia, le due Misie, cioè Seruia, & Morea, L'Albania, la Boffina, la Bulgaria, & nella Macedonia, la Tessaglia, la Focide, & la Bretia fino a' confini d'Vngeria.

Nell'Asia.

La Natolia, che comprende

L'Assiria, l'Armenia, la Media, la Persia, la Soria, quello che possiede de' Mori, la Cilicia, la Cappadocia, la Mesopotamia, la Bursia, Alessandria, il Cairo, & Cipri.

Caua il Turco

Dell'Asia vn milione, & 500. milia ducati compreso vn ducato, & mezzo, che paga ogni Christiano quiui habitante.

Del ducato di Arcogo 200. milia.

Dello Egitto, Cairo, & Arabia vn milione e 800. milia.

~~Della Sicilia, & del paese ind' intorno 600. milia~~

Della Mesopotamia 200. milia

Della Moldauia per tributo 160. milia.

Della Vallachia per tributo 12. milia.

Della Transilvania per tributo 10. milia.

Di Ragusa per tributo 10. milia.

Di Scio per lo istesso gia 10. milia.

Dello Arcipelago 6. milia

Di Cipri altre volte 8. milia.

L'utile delle patente, priuilegi, breui, commandamenti, & altre scritture publike sonno 100. milia.

Delle robbe, & facultà di chi more senza heredi caua 300. milia.

Le minere gli rendono vn milione e mezzo d'oro.

L'entrate di tutti li datij, & commercij dello Imperio, vn milione, & 200. milia.

Tutte le decime de' frumenti, & frutti 800. milia.

La somma di tutta questa entrata sono Milioni otto,
& 356. milia ducati.

Spende il Turco nel mantenere i suoi prouionati, gli huomini di guerra, & in fra molte altre cose necessarie per conseruare il suo imperio, quasi 7. milioni d'oro. Egli ne suoi Regni, & stati ha pochissime fortezze: le quali sono state fatte da Christiani, & poscia da lui occupate.

La militia de' suoi Gianizzari; in cui consiste lo sforzo delle suoi armi, è stimata in torno à 16. milia.

Il maggior neruo della sua militia consiste nel numero di cento ottanta milia casuali, chiamati Saphi: le quali forze sono atte solo à guerreggiare in campagne aperte Eli di tanta sua militia ha pochissimi capi di valore, & di giudicio. Onde hauendo à combattere con essa gente di fermezza, & ordinanza; come sonno Italiani, Spagnuoli, Tedeschi, & Francesi; riportarebbe di lei certa vittoria; essendo il valore di cotai popoli, & la disciplina militare maggiore, & di gran lunga più eccellente della Turchesca si come molto ben fanno i giudiciofi, & esercitati nell'arme militare.

Le forze di Mare sono state ultimamente circa 200. Galee; vna grã parte delle quali egli ha tolto à Christiani per lo passato. Quando ei non hauesse la fedel seruitù de' Renegati, nulla, o poco ei potrebbe contra i Christiani, & massime se; come il Rè Catholico; fosse tal' hora da suoi ministri mal seruito, nè gli fossero, come gli sono, così fedeli, & obbedienti i suoi.

IN PER VIGIA per Pietropaolo Orlando
Con Licentia de' Superiori.

THE UNEXPECTED OTTOMAN GUEST: AHMED AGHA IN MADRID (1649–50)

JORGE FERNÁNDEZ-SANTOS
AND HÜSEYİN SERDAR TABAKOĞLU

*The Turk has arrived in Spain
and although subject to a different law
his presence affords great glory to the king
—provided he deceives us not.
Hence the diligence and cunning
that shall shield us:
to honour him without loss,
to cheer him without spending,
to take leave of him without delay
and to turn him down without falling-out.*

Salvador Jacinto Polo de Medina (1650)¹

The arrival in Madrid in the late summer of 1649 of an Ottoman official styling himself as the Sultan's ambassador was, to say the least, unexpected. Travelling at inordinate speed with the minimum of attendants and luggage² the emissary reached the gates of Madrid literally on the heels of the couriers dispatched in haste by the viceroys of Naples and Valencia to warn

1. *Kingdoms and States of King Philip and the Great Turk with Their Respective Revenues and Expenditures and Other Remarkable Things* (Perugia, p.q. 1640, broadsheet). Rome, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale Vittorio Emanuele II.

1 *A La venida de Mahomet Mostafá Hagá, Embax.^r del Gran Turco, que entró en Madrid, a 15 de Set.^r de 1649*: 'El turco ha venido a España / y aunq[ue] de distinta ley / es gran gloria para el rey / si en algo no nos engaña: / pero la yndustria, y la maña, / q[ue] nos sabrá defender / es, honrrarle sin perder / festexarle sin gastar / despedirle sin tardar, / y negarle sin romper'. BHAM, Ms. R/2629⁽²¹⁾, p. 328. The poem's attribution to Polo de Medina is based on BNE, Ms. 23129⁽¹⁷⁾, fol. 5r. The same poem has been misattributed (?) to an obscure poet named Fermín de Sarasa y Arce on the basis of HSA, cod. B2492, fol. 93r (no. 109). See SERRANO DE HARO (1986), pp. 241, 261.

2 DUJČEV (1935), p. 144. Astonishingly, Agha completed his long journey in about two months. He employed precisely 11 days and 8 hours from Constantinople to Ragusa (Dubrovnik). *Consulta* dated 4 September 1649 in AHN, Estado, leg. 2879. The Ottoman envoy arrived in Trani on 19 July 1649. BNE, Ms. 2437, fol. 213r.



MAHOMET 4.^e Empereur de Constantinople, apres la deposition de son pere Ibrahim, qui mourut en prison quelques iours apres le 18. Aoust 1648. La Sultane sa grande mere, et quelques principaux officiers de sa Cour, Gouvernent tout ce grand Estat pendant sa minorite.

A Paris chez Baltazar Moncornet Avec privilege du Roy

3. Balthazar Moncornet, *Equestrian Portrait of the Child Sultan Mehmed IV*, c. 1650. Etching and engraving, 202 × 137 mm. Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France.

Since Kara Murad Pasha refused to renew Ahmed Agha's credentials and accept Spanish mediation between Ottomans and Venetians, Alleghetti concluded that the former had no real interest in peace. On 2 May 1650, Alleghetti, who had arrived on 31 March, was given leave to return to Madrid.⁶⁰ The Spanish agent reported that Ahmed Agha, whose main task was to prevent Spain from helping Venice, should be regarded as the grand vizier's personal envoy. Although the sultan had been informed, Agha's entire mission depended squarely on whether Kara Murad Pasha managed or not to stay in office.⁶¹ As it turned out, when the Venetians blockaded the Dardanelles in the summer of 1650, Kara Murad Pasha's rivals seized the opportunity to overthrow him, forcing him to step down on 5 August 1650. His trusted advisers, the *müneccimbaşı* and Budak-zâde, were sent into exile and subsequently put to death.⁶²

'AMBASSADORIAL' CREDENTIALS LOST IN TRANSLATION

The imperial letters that Ahmed Agha handed over in his second audience at the Alcázar in 1649 bore no *tughra* (imperial monogram). In contrast, one of the missives presented to Alleghetti in Istanbul the following year was headed, as was customary in Ottoman imperial letters addressed to European rulers, with the sultan's monogram (fig. 4). Although it took nearly a year, which was the time that had elapsed between Agha's arrival in Madrid and Alleghetti's return to the Spanish capital, this highly signifi-

cant detail did not escape the notice of Spanish statesmen.⁶³ Like most unofficial missives, the letters Agha brought with him in 1649 included only the signature and seal in the right margin.⁶⁴ Contrary to standard diplomatic correspondence, the wording left no doubt that it was Kara Murad Pasha representing Mehmed IV with full authority (*vekâlet-i mutlaka-i saltanat-ı 'aliyye olduğumuza binâen*) and not the sultan himself who was addressing Philip IV in writing.⁶⁵ It is true that the sultan, then only a child, was unlikely to be directly involved in state matters. Moreover, it may be argued that the sultan's grandmother Kösem Valide Sultan, the true power behind the grand vizier, may have manipulated the diplomatic correspondence with Spain.⁶⁶ It was after all she who had disagreed decades earlier with her young son Murad IV and most leading statesmen on the wisdom of a truce with Spain. Venetian diplomats reported in 1625 that Spaniards had pinned their hopes solely on Rejep Pasha, on Bayram Pasha and on the Sultan's mother and daughter.⁶⁷

The imperial ambassador at the Spanish court, Francesco Antonio del Carretto, Marquess of Grana, and the Viceroy of Naples, the Count of Oñate, provided upon request information on how Turkish diplomats were received at the Habsburg court in Vienna.⁶⁸ It must have been plain to the Council of State in Madrid that Ahmed Agha belonged to a broadly defined intermediate rank: short of 'great ambassador'—such as a pasha or a chiaus-bashi (*çavuşbaşı*)—but ahead of *sipahi* or a simple *çavuş* or messenger.⁶⁹

60 UZUNÇARŞILI (1977), p. 220. See *R[elaci]ón que haze don Alegreto Alegreti...* (note 54 *ut supra*).

61 CONDE (2011), pp. 13–14.

62 ÖZCAN (1999), pp. 494–95. İPŞIRLI (2007), pp. 1264–68. When it was discovered that, in fact, the *müneccimbaşı* Hüseyin Efendi had never left Istanbul, he was summarily executed. See İPŞIRLI (2007), pp. 1271–74.

63 'Oí se reconoce por las cartas çitadas q[ue] d[on] Alegreto ha trahído, y [...] si bien en la del Gran Turco que aora se ha traduçido confiesa que [Ahmed Agha] vino con su sabiduría y consentimiento, diçe que le embió su visir, y esta carta así en la firma como en el sello y aforro en que vino cubierta es diferente de la presentó a V[uestra] Mg[esta]d Amete Aga, y aquélla, y la // que ahora ha trahído Alegreti en nombre del visir, son vniformes en todas las señales sin diferençia ninguna'. See the *consulta* of the Council of State dated 5 September 1650 in AHN, Estado, leg. 2871. Moreover, on the verso of doc. 11 (quoted in note 64 *ut infra*; Appendix A2) one reads in seventeenth-century writing a clear reminder that although its bearer Ahmed Agha claimed it was a sultanic missive, it was merely vizierial: 'Carta que trujo el embajador Amete Agá quando vino de Constantinopla a Madrid por agosto de 1649. Y si bien quando la presentó este embax[ad]or para ser oído de Su M[agesta]d dijo que era del Gran Turco, se reconoçió últimamente, por otras que vinieron después, no ser ésta sino del primer visir'.

64 AHN, Estado, leg. 4257, exp. 2, docs. 11, 13 (Appendix A1, A2, B1, B2). KÜTÜKOĞLU (1994), pp. 155–56.

65 AHN, Estado, leg. 4257, exp. 2, doc. 11 (Appendix A1, A2).

66 İNALCIK (2014), pp. 270–74.

67 Moreover, Bayram Pasha, governor of Egypt, was married to one of Kösem's daughters and it is likely that the admiral Rejep Pasha was also Kösem's *damad* or son-in-law. PEIRCE (1993), p. 226.

68 On Grana, see Tercero Casado's chapter in this volume. For Grana's involvement in reporting Agha's activities in Madrid, see TERCERO CASADO (in press).

69 *Consulta* dated 4 September 1649 in AHN, Estado, leg. 2879.



HARBINGER OF A PROSPECTIVE ALLIANCE WITH DUCAL MODENA: THE DIPLOMAT AND POET FULVIO TESTI'S MISSIONS TO MADRID (1636, 1638)

MERCEDES SIMAL LÓPEZ

The role played by Fulvio Testi (1593–1646; fig. 1) throughout his career exceeded the traditional duties of a diplomat, minister or secretary of state. Indeed, he contributed significantly to shaping the image of Francesco I d'Este (1610–1658; fig. 2) and almost became his *alter ego*, deciding on political leanings, stimulating ambitions and recommending appropriate conducts.¹

Born in Ferrara in August 1593, Testi was the son of Giulio Testi, a lowly officer of the court of Este, and Margarita Calmoni, who died when Fulvio was only four. He was schooled by the Jesuits in Modena and went on to read philosophy at Bologna and Ferrara. In 1612 he became a *scrivano* to Duke Cesare d'Este and two years later married Ana Leni, a native of Modena. Testi very soon began to conduct himself with a violent anti-Spanish bias in political and diplomatic affairs. He expressed this sentiment in the *Pianto d'Italia*, composed in 1613 and reprinted in Modena in 1617, which earned him temporary exile.² In 1619 he was appointed as *virtuoso di camera* and went on to hold various diplomatic posts as representative of the Duke of Modena in Rome, Genoa, Mantua, Turin, Milan, Venice and Vienna, which enabled him to secure a fief and the title of count.³ His rantings against Spanish control in Italy published two decades earlier do not seem to have been a hindrance to his twice being designated as the Duke of Modena's ambassador extraordinary to Philip IV in 1635 and 1637.

The purpose of this appointment was ultimately to persuade the Spanish king to grant the highest honours to Francesco I—if possible the title of Highness

I would like to thank José Luis Colomer and Jorge Fernández-Santos for kindly inviting me to contribute to this book and for their assistance and patience in bringing it to successful completion. I am likewise indebted to Antonio Denunzio and Giovanni Sartori for their help in clarifying various aspects of Testi's life and the ambassadors to the dukes of Modena during Philip IV's reign.

1 SIGNOROTTO (2012), p. 25.

2 Essential works on Testi's life continue to be TIRABOSCHI (1780) and CASTRO (1875/1960).

3 CASTRO (1875/1960).

1. Ludovico Lana, *Fulvio Testi*, early 1630s. Oil on canvas, 68.5 × 50.5 cm. Modena, Gallerie Estensi.



13. Diego Velázquez, *Francesco I d'Este*, 1638. Oil on canvas, 68 × 51 cm. Modena, Gallerie Estensi.

Returning to the Duke of Modena's stay in Madrid, on the 24th he took oath of office from the king as general of the armadas.¹¹² Most likely as a result of this appointment, Velázquez was commissioned by Philip IV to paint another grand portrait of the Duke of Modena, this time equestrian, showing Francesco I attired in his general's uniform, of which the painter was also instructed to make a copy if the end result proved satisfactory.¹¹³ In addition, Philip IV

took Francesco I to visit two royally founded convents very closely connected to the Crown: the Encarnación and the Descalzas Reales. The latter had been the residence of the duke's sister, Caterina Maria d'Este, who took the habit there in 1622 at the age of eight and died, still too young to profess, on 23 January 1628.¹¹⁴ The convent preserved several portraits of her (fig. 14),¹¹⁵ and it is highly likely that Francesco I prayed before his sister's mortal remains during his visit.¹¹⁶

The day of his departure saw another exchange of gifts between the Duke of Modena and the king and queen, which was reported on by all the chroniclers. Deciding on the gift had been a lengthy process: Testi had made enquiries about the monarch's and the count-duke's tastes and had insistently recommended that his master choose for Philip IV a painting by Correggio—who was not represented in the royal collection—and another by Guercino, Guido Reni, Veronese, Dosso Dossi or Girolamo da Carpi, which would be easy to transport. Despite realising that the duke, as an art lover, would be loath to part with them, Testi believed they were a necessary sacrifice for the sake of achieving more important goals.¹¹⁷

Although, judging by the correspondence Cardinal Caetani in Rome exchanged with Cardinal Carlo de' Medici, the Duke of Modena initially appeared to have followed his ambassador's recommendations,¹¹⁸ Francesco I finally gave Philip IV sixteen magnificent horses;¹¹⁹ Isabella of Bourbon received a 'casket of rock crystal with gold mounts, studded all over with diamonds and other precious stones with a cross on top, all made of diamonds, and the cross is worth 25 silver [coins] and the casket is furthermore full of gold and jewelled flowers imitating real ones' on behalf of the Duchess of Modena, Maria Farnese; and the Count-Duke

112 A copy of the oath and title are preserved in the AHN, Estado, libro 269, fols. 83v–84, 94–98.

113 VENTURI (1881), p. 49.

114 SÁNCHEZ (1997), p. 84. SÁNCHEZ (2008), pp. 151–54.

115 GARCÍA AND RUIZ (1996).

116 SÁNCHEZ (1997), p. 384. VILACOPA AND MUÑOZ (2010), p. 131. Sor Catalina's body is now buried together with that of Sor Margarita de la Cruz in one of the convent's vaults in the cloistered area in a tomb whose headstone bears the following inscription: 'Aquí yacen las Ser[enisi]mas S[eño]ras Sor Catalina M[ar]ía de Este, hija de los príncipes de Módena, y Sor Margarita de la Cruz, hija del S[eño]r D[on] Juan de Austria. Falleció la primera siendo religiosa novicia de esta real casa en el año 1628 y la segunda religiosa profesora en el año 1686. R.I.P.'. I am grateful to Ana García Sanz, curator of the convent of the Descalzas Reales, for helping answer my queries.

117 VENTURI (1881), p. 45. JUSTI (1888/1999), p. 418.

118 SALORT (2002), p. 188 and doc. b20. CAVICCHIOLI (2012), pp. 257–58.

119 We know from a letter from Testi dated 15 September 1638 that these horses were initially intended for the *valido*, but he refused to accept them and only consented to their being given to the king. TESTI (1967), vol. 3, p. 61.



PHILIP IV'S AMBASSADORS

MIGUEL-ÁNGEL OCHOA BRUN

ADVICE ON GOVERNANCE

Advertencias para reyes, príncipes y embajadores was the title of a book published in Madrid in 1643. Its author was Don Cristóbal de Benavente y Benavides, Count of Fontanar (c. 1582–1649). Born in Valladolid and a knight of the Order of Santiago, he had served Philip IV (fig. 1) as a distinguished ambassador at several European courts.¹ The book was a treatise on politics, a compilation of advice on good governance (fig. 2). It aimed to suggest rules for monarchs—no doubt especially Philip IV—and also for princes, who were expected to govern: the book was dedicated to the Prince of Asturias, Don Baltasar Carlos, Spain's then well-grounded and subsequently dashed hope. But the advice was also—and this is what concerns us here—aimed at ambassadors, who are regarded not so much as mere instruments of governance than as jointly responsible for, and architects of, the wholesome and appropriate policy which the author of the book, imbued with Baroque wisdom, set out to advocate, advise and even decide on. He thus presents ambassadors as being capable of acting alongside kings, who could do with being advised on how to conduct politics well.

The era—the throes of the Baroque period—was a time of advice on prudence. Three years later Baltasar Gracián published his *Oráculo manual*. But the book by the ambassador Count of Fontanar was a treatise on political prudence and good governance—in theory at least. Such works were also abundant during the period. Politics was not only a reality that was played out on the complex European stage but also a doctrinal concern that required a combination of wise maxims and pithy notions and suggestions, as

1. Diego Velázquez, *Philip IV in a Yellow Doublet* (detail of Longstaffe-Gowan, fig. 13), 1628. Oil on canvas, 205 × 117 cm. Sarasota (Florida), John and Mable Ringling Museum of Art.

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1 BENAVENTE Y BENAVIDES (1643). He was appointed as ambassador to Philip IV in England and in the Empire in 1629, in Venice (1624–32) and in France (1632–35). Benavente was also a member of the Council of War.



11. Diego Velázquez, *Philip IV on Horseback*, c. 1635. Oil on canvas, 303 × 317 cm. Madrid, Museo Nacional del Prado.

In fact, the iconography of Philip IV, generally austere and always supremely dignified, contrasts with the insufferable frippery of the sumptuous and smug portraits of Louis XIV, dripping with ermine, his sickly figure raised on deceitful pretentious heels. For Velázquez and Rigaud are poles apart.

There are also poetic portraits of Philip which underline the elegant sobriety of his attire and his human impulses. Manuel Machado's tercets are famous.⁷² Less well known, perhaps unfairly, are those of a sonnet⁷³ that is more relevant here as it was written by a poet and diplomat

72 'Nadie más cortesano ni pulido / que nuestro Rey Felipe, que Dios guarde, / siempre de negro hasta los pies vestido' (Nobody is courtier or more refined than our King Philip, may God preserve him, always dressed in black from head to foot). Except that Machado got the portraits mixed up and referred to Philip as sporting the glove that is worn by his brother the Infante Don Carlos.

73 It begins 'Claros los ojos, pálida la frente, / el oro del cabello desteñido, / claro el rubio bigote retorcido, / grueso el labio, la barba prominente' (Light-coloured eyes, pale forehead, the gold of his hair faded, a pale crooked blonde moustache, full lips, prominent chin).

HELIPPE III MAYOR MONARCHA DEL MUNDO



Con Privilegio

P^o DIAZ MORA DE