AMBASSADORS IN 
Golden-Age Madrid 
The Court of Philip IV 
through Foreign Eyes 

edited by 
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and 
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In the summer of 1963 Lord Hailsham, at that time the British Minister for Science, came back from Moscow, where he had been sent as the emissary of the Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, to take part in negotiations being conducted with the Russians for partial nuclear disarmament. He returned to London with presents for Macmillan from his opposite number, Nikita Kruschev, the Premier of the Soviet Union. These consisted of caviar, crab meat and wine. Macmillan reciprocated with a vase and some Stilton cheese. 

It was one further, and rather banal, episode in the long story of diplomatic gift-giving that is a central theme of this book.

Madrid, the seat of the Spanish court since 1561, was a great, and perhaps the greatest, European centre for the exchange of diplomatic gifts during the later sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Effectively the capital of a worldwide monarchy, the Monarquía española, Madrid exercised a gravitational pull over the representatives of the other states of Europe, whether they were enemies or rivals, allies or satellites of the Spanish crown. At least until the 1640s and 1650s, when Spain’s European hegemony ceased to be taken for granted, the Spanish Habsburg monarchs, Philip II, Philip III and Philip IV, enjoyed a commanding position on the international stage. They and their ministers therefore needed to be courted and wooed, and an essential part of the wooing process was the giving of gifts.

As this volume makes abundantly clear, there was nothing simple or straightforward about giving a present in early modern Europe. It was conditioned by considerations of rank and hierarchy, it was embedded in the conventions of protocol and ceremonial that defined and embalmed court culture, and it was shrouded in a series of arcane rituals that make its practice almost incomprehensible to modern readers. It touched on questions of honour and reputation that lay at the heart of civilized society, and was capable of arousing such
The very use of the word ‘Hispaniolized’ reflects a sense of distinctive national identity—in this instance Spanish national identity—that generated widespread discussion in a Europe caught up in the throes of intense political and religious conflict. The more that countries borrowed from, and imitated, each other, the more anxious they became to cultivate their own image and scrutinize that of their rivals. The interplay of national differences and similarities, simultaneously acknowledging the realities of enmity while holding out the possibility of future friendship, was the theme of Carlos García’s famous treatise of 1617 on the antipathy of the French and the Spanish. Every country is sensitive about how it is viewed by others, and, as the policies pursued by the courts of Philip IV and later of Louis XIV make clear, monarchs and their ministers found new and more elaborate ways of projecting on the international stage the image of themselves that they wanted to convey. For Olivarres, Philip was the ‘king of kings’, whose nominal position as the ruler of the greatest monarchy on earth demanded a cultural as well as a political and military programme that would underline his superiority in the arts both of war and peace. The construction of the palace of the Buen Retiro in the 1630s, royal patronage of artists, playwrights, poets and men of letters, the mounting of fiestas and lavish stage spectacles, were all designed to win immortal fame for Philip and impress visiting foreign dignitaries and ambassadors with his power, wealth and magnificence (fig. 7). They certainly impressed the Duke of Modena and Fulvio Testi.

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24 García (1617/1979); and see Bertrand Haan’s chapter in this volume, p. 160.
TEATRO
DE LAS GRANDEZAS
de la Villa de Madrid Corte de
los Reyes Católicos de España
AL MUY PODEROSO
SEÑOR REY
Don FILIPE VIII
POR EL MAESTRO
Gil González Dávila
su Coronista
In Room 2 of the National Portrait Gallery (NPG) hangs a one-of-a-kind anonymous oil painting on panel (fig. 2). Its dating to around 1596 is based on the assumption it must have been commissioned shortly after the death of Sir Henry Unton (c. 1558–1596) by his widow Dorothy Wroughton as a posthumous commemoration. Catalogued as a highly unusual ‘narrative portrait’, its centre is taken up by Unton’s likeness flanked by Fame and Death. Ten scenes unfold anticlockwise from the bottom right-hand corner: Unton nursed by his mother; studies at Oxford; Grand Tourist crossing the Alps en route to Venice and Padua; military service in the Netherlands; last and ill-fated diplomatic mission to France; death while attended to by a physician sent by Henry IV; repatriation of mortal remains across the Channel; the hearse on its way to Wadley House at Faringdon; life at Wadley House, from where the funeral procession departs; and the funeral in progress with the funerary monument to be built in the foreground. The widow referred to the painting in her will as a ‘story picture’ and Roy Strong preferred to call it ‘an Elizabethan memorial picture’. Apparently, no similar painting in vignettes covering an early modern ambassador’s entire lifespan has survived. We would be of course mistaken to expect to find an equivalent for any of the foreign ambassadors to Philip IV’s court, including those covered in this volume, or for those the Planet King sent to foreign courts. Several from the former group, as we shall see, died in Madrid while discharging their duties. Yet, despite its rarity, the anonymous painting calls attention to what may be described as an increasingly widespread historical self-consciousness among early modern diplomats and their closest relatives. Like Dorothy Wroughton before her, Lady Ann Fanshawe took it upon herself to erect a tomb to remember her late husband by—one which, unlike Unton’s, has survived and which Piers Baker-Bates describes as a ‘sizeable but standard’ wall monument whose diminished visual

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1. Title page to *Teatro de las grandezas de la villa de Madrid corte de los Reyes Católicos de España*, de Gil González Dávila (Madrid, 1623, folio). Madrid, Biblioteca Nacional de España.


3. Ochoa Brun (2005) and see the Epilogue to this book.
The present volume brings together a diverse but coherent anthology of essays on embassies to the court of Philip IV which builds on the wealth of scholarship on early modern diplomacy and the foreign relations of Habsburg Spain. While not aspiring to fully cover the subject, the fourteen case studies it includes paint a broad picture of exchanges between a composite monarchy at pains to preserve its hegemonic role and a variety of powers ranging from city-state through republic to kingdom and empire. The connections with such a vast territorial network are scrutinised by an international group of academics, museum curators and independent researchers, who thus provide a dialogue between disciplines but also different approaches to diplomatic history.

Despite the diversity of their areas of expertise, most of the contributors to this publication share an interest in the exchange of gifts as a standard practice in the interactions of states. The giving and receiving of gifts runs through the entire book as an indispensable ingredient of diplomacy between European powers. Much attention is paid by our authors to the manner in which precious artefacts and prized goods were chosen and intended as tokens of gratitude or appreciation; the rituals of their display and presentation are taken into consideration as part of the protocol that had a central place in court society; and many of these essays likewise focus on the significance of gifts and their role in the success of a negotiation, but also on the numerous conflicts that arose over how they were interpreted.

Such meticulous swaps across political and religious boundaries are an object of keen analysis nowadays, as historiography of the gift has expanded into a subfield of research in itself. Based on anthropological studies that regard

1. Adam Frans van der Meulen after a drawing by Charles Le Brun, Meeting of Louis XIV and Philip IV on the Isle of Pheasants, 1660. Oil on copper, 56.5 × 39.7 cm. London, private collection.

Infanta Maria Teresa’s christening as godfather, he was invested with the Order with the Golden Fleece and given two Velázquezs: the splendid portrait for which he sat during his stay in Madrid, now in the Pinacoteca Estense, and a miniature of Philip IV that was mounted on the reverse of a diamond eagle.  

Painted portraits were an important means of self-representation and of taking sides in the European wars, and sovereigns therefore used them for specific political purposes: here we see how Władysław Vasa had his ambassador Mąkowski stop off in Brussels during his first trip to Spain in 1627 to present the by then widowed regent Isabella, Philip IV’s aunt, with a three-quarter-length portrait of himself in Spanish attire by Rubens—an indication of his hopes of garnering support from the Habsburgs for the ongoing war with Sweden (see Kieniewicz and Urjasz-Raczko, fig. 4). Similar undertones of political alliance pervade many portraits of Philip IV, which, although not gifts from the king, nevertheless required his approval as they were commissioned by foreign representatives in Madrid to take back with them to their countries of origin as a sign of hispanophilia or, at least, as a testament to their prestigious mission in Spain. It was a common gesture among papal envoys: we know that the nuncios Giulio Sacchetti (1625) and Giovanni Battista Pamphilj (1630) had copies made at the Alcázar or at the residence of the Count-Duke of Olivares of likenesses of the royal family which they later hung in their Roman palaces. Similarly, in 1657 Camillo Massimo, who had already sat for Diego Velázquez in Rome in 1650, may have obtained from the painter of Las Meninas original portraits of the king and queen and the infantas, which he subsequently displayed alongside the splendid works in his residence on the Via delle Quattro Fontane. In general, the picture galleries of the cardinals’ impressive palaces proudly attested to the political affiliation of their owners, who drew attention to their services rendered to one of the powers then vying for control of Europe: as a member of a family with longstanding ties to Spain and a prominent international agent of Philip IV, Cardinal Girolamo Colonna hung in his apartments a likeness of himself together with pictures of the pope, the emperor and the Spanish royal family. The latter were probably the portraits he took back with him from Madrid at the end of his stint at the court in the 1620s. Cardinal Francesco Barberini also commissioned several likenesses of the royal family at the end of his trip to Spain as legate a latere in 1626; two decades later, although portraits of the Bourbons were predominant in his Roman residence as a result of his preferential relations with France, several portraits of Philip IV—full-length and in other formats—also hung there, as did a likeness of Prince Baltasar Carlos.  

The tokens of royal gratitude and generosity listed here also include Spanish purebred horses, highly appreciated by their recipients as they enjoyed great prestige among the international elites. A ‘very good’ grey specimen seemed to be a most appropriate and thoughtful farewell gift for the Ottoman envoy Ahmed Agha in 1650, news of whose skilled horsemanship had reached the ears of the court.  

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40 Colomer (2002).
42 See Jorge Fernández-Santos and Hüseyin Serdar Tabakoğlu’s chapter in this volume, p. 483.
‘CHAPEL’
AMBASSADORS
VENETIAN PERCEPTIONS OF IMPERIAL SPAIN: FROM FEAR AND PHOBIA TO PRUDENT CAUTION

When, on 4 November 1619, Giacomo Querini1 was born to a patrician family in Venice (fig. 1)—and thus automatically destined by his noble birth to a career in politics—relations between Venice and Spain flowed smoothly, in the pursuit of a continuity that had begun in the mid-1500s and was to endure until 1796. This consorting between the two capitals was nourished by ceremonious exchange: the great reverence for the Catholic Kings on the part of the Serenissima was reciprocated by the monarchs with declarations of esteem, for the reigning Doge as well as for the state he embodied. Diplomacy also consists of these qualities: the utmost possible courtesy, feigning what one does not experience, and instead concealing what one does—that is, what one really feels and thinks. It was because its ambassadors in Madrid were virtuosos in both dissimulation and simulation that anti-Spanish attitudes remained tacit, boiling up again from time to time, but not resulting in direct confrontation, in which the Republic would be on the losing side if it acted alone.

This in no way altered the fact that in Venice, whether in its command centre in the Doges’ Palace or in the mercantile hubbub of the Rialto, antipathy towards Spain was spreading in an explicit way, swelling into a state of hatred. A long-term rift was triggered by the separate peace brokered in 1573 by the Republic with the Empire of the Ottomans, a treaty motivated in part by the need to watch one’s back with respect to an infidel ally within the Holy League—Spain—from whom some feared an attack, while Venice was quite ready to pit itself against the Crescent. Better—at the risk of losing

1 See the entry on Querini in Benzoni (2016), with sources and bibliography.
Cyprus—to re-establish merchant shipping on the Venice–Constantinople axis than to be vulnerable, through Milan and Naples, to Spanish pressure. Better to enhance vigilance in the West—strengthened by walls at Bergamo and the fortress-city of Palma, an Eastern sentinel against the Imperial Habsburgs, conniving with Spanish policies—after achieving peace with the Turks than to persist in a state of war with them, in the meantime weakening Venice’s own defensive and reactive capacity with regard to Spanish intentions. Better, in the face of a suffocating Habsburg pincer movement threatening Venice’s freedom and independence, to have peace in the East.

It was at least as early as 1573 that Venice—which had triumphed over the Turk in 1571, at Lepanto, hand in hand with Spain—considered the latter, not the Turk, to be a more dangerous enemy. And as such, it feared Spain, detesting it; and hated Spain, being afraid of it. How could it not bear hatred towards the Kingdom? Even the ‘sky’, even ‘nature’ detested ‘how Spain is proceeding’, noted an anonymous Venetian patrician in his early sixteenth-century diary. ‘Sancte Turca, libera nos’ from Spanish invasiveness, pleaded Paolo Sarpi (fig. 2) in 1609—he, the consulatore in iure (expert legal counsel) of the Serenissima, the champion of the Republic’s sovereignty, excommunicated by Rome. ‘None of us—again Sarpi, in 1610—ignores Spain’s animosity towards us’. Venice was always on its guard with respect to the Catholic Kings, and always vigilant of anyone—in the Senate (the Venetian state’s decision-making body, responsible for both domestic and foreign policy), or in Venice, under some cover or other—suspected of being pro-Spanish. Like the bailo Girolamo Lippomano, for example, recalled from his post, arrested and drowned on his way back to Venice in 1591. Or Isep-po Donà, an informer of the Spanish ambassador found negotiating with the Governor of Milan, no less, and therefore hanged on 19 March 1601. Also hanged, on 18 May 1618, were the handful of presumed Bedmar conspirators (fig. 3). This was the name of the Spanish ambassador whose overambitious scheming against the Republic provided the Council of Ten with a pretext for pre-emptive action and a recall of the diplomat, who was replaced by another irritatingly hostile envoy.

Yet the Republic had never been under actual threat. For a moment the population believed this, yelling threats as they thronged in front of the Spanish embassy. We should add, though it is more invented than documented, the subsequent narrative of Venice barely avoiding an actual coup; and in 1674 there appeared the fictional Coniuration des Espagnols contre … Venise by César Vichard, Abbé de Saint-Réal—the author whose Dom Carlos of 1672 had taken for granted the prince’s love for his stepmother. This last point was later dwelt upon by Thomas Otway, Friedrich Schiller, and Giuseppe Verdi in his musical melodrama, and took a sharp upward swing in the world of theatre with Hugo von Hofmannsthal’s version of Otway’s

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2 On the anti-Spanish motivations implied in the 1573 peace with the Turk see Benzoni (2013).
4 ‘Nemo nostrum ignorat infensus nobis Hispani animum.’ Sarpi’s correspondence—especially the *Lettere ai protestanti* and the *Lettere ai gallicani*—frequently refers to the danger represented by Spain. See Sarpi (1931) and Sarpi (1961).
5 An outline of both Lippomano and Donà is given by Gullino (1991) and Gullino (2005).
6 On which see especially Spini (1949–50). See also Seco Serrano (1989) and Preto (1996).
The tension in the air in the royal residence of the Alcázar towards the end of 1648 did not go unnoticed to any of the ambassadors who roamed its corridors. During those chilly November days, the palatial fortress became a highly troubled setting for a man considered a privileged ‘family agent’: the ambassador of the Holy Roman Empire, a territorial conglomerate whose elective crown was then held by the Viennese branch of the House of Habsburg. The daily audiences with the ‘Catholic King’ had become a heavy burden overnight for its representative, the Marquess of Grana, on account of the tense climate of mistrust between the two principal lines of the dynasty. The ministers could barely grasp the immediacy of what was perceived as a blatant ‘betrayal’ by Philip IV’s brother-in-law, Emperor Ferdinand III, of his Spanish relatives. The peace agreement signed unilaterally by the emperor and France at Münster on 24 October put an end to a lengthy war that had begun in 1618. However, peace had come at a high price: Ferdinand III found himself forced to abandon Madrid, Vienna’s natural ally for centuries, to its own devices and Philip IV was left to face single-handedly the unrelenting attack of an emerging France anxious to take over from the Spanish Monarchy as continental hegemon. The otherwise experienced imperial ambassador was overwhelmed by a situation whose consequences he had not bargained for. His master’s difficult and controversial decision led to the questioning of his capacity as trusted envoy with special privileges.

The imperial ambassador Francesco Antonio del Carretto y Argote, 2nd Marquess of Grana and Count of Millesimo (1594–1651; fig. 1), has sparked somewhat clashing opinions among specialists and contemporaries. Historians such as Grete Mecenseffy, Henri Piquer and Lothar Höbelt all stress the


1 On the impact of peace on family ties and a detailed survey of bilateral relations during this period immediately after Westphalia, see TERCERO CASADO (2017).
The struggle for dominance between the Spanish and French crowns since the early sixteenth century scaled new heights at the peace negotiations of 1659. It influenced events in both military and diplomatic terms, while also subtly shaping the protocol of public events, helping consolidate the image of the two sovereigns.

Only rarely did the balance of power favour the king of France on such issues. At the end of a conflict whose outcome had long been uncertain, his 1657 alliance with Cromwell gave him the upper hand in military terms. The treaty signed in Paris in May 1659 and then debated afresh at the border in the Pyrenees from 13 August that same year was clearly to his advantage. The marriage of Maria Theresa and Louis XIV was intended to seal the treaty. Protocol dictated that the suitor should ask for the infanta’s hand using a diplomat as a go-between. As host, the Spanish camp was in a position to dictate the rules of the game. They seized the opportunity for symbolic revenge, the scope, forms and meaning of which are the focus of the present chapter.

Madrid organised a range of festivities for the arrival of the Duke of Gramont (fig. 1), the French ambassador. The king, the grandees and the court were presented to him along with the capital and royal palaces, in many cases deliberately set up to show them at their most impressive. The event had interesting diplomatic, ceremonial and artistic implications. The celebration of a dynastic union gave the Spaniards and their visitors alike the opportunity to display their mastery of pomp and ceremony, conversation and etiquette, while the Spanish side was also in a position to show off its flair and generosity.


1 Mazarin to Le Tellier, 24 October 1659, BNF-Fr., ms. 4214, fol. 127v.
2 Colomer (2003).
as host. The sequence of events during the diplomatic mission should not, however, be conflated with readings of the event itself, which changed over time, depending on the relationship between the two monarchies.

**A prestigious diplomatic mission**

Louis XIV’s representative had nothing to negotiate; rather, his mission was part of an elaborate diplomatic game. Philip IV’s valido Luis de Haro found the terms of the treaty signed in Paris unfair and humiliating, and was aiming for a more equitable agreement; Mazarin was unwell and wanted a quick settlement. For such a symbolic mission to the Spanish king, the ambassador’s birth, rank and closeness to the king of France were the key criteria. Finding a candidate who would meet with approval on both sides was a delicate proposition.3

**A strict set of criteria**

At the Paris negotiations, Mazarin had brought up the name of Eugène-Maurice de Savoie, Count of Soissons, who had ties to the royal families of Savoy and France and to Mazarin himself, having married his niece. As a prince of the blood (*prince du sang*), he had a claim to and indeed held the title of Highness, making him of higher rank than the Spanish grandees. His nomination therefore risked reviving a quarrel over the respective merits of the French and Spanish aristocracies. Mazarin originally suggested that some way round the problem could be found, but the count’s mother, the Princess of Carignano, remained firmly opposed to the idea, citing the example of Thomas of Savoy and his older brother Philibert, Viceroy of Sicily. Mazarin and Hugues de Lionne, who had devoted several years to the negotiations between France and Spain, insisted on maintaining a strict set of criteria, arguing particularly that royal blood flowed in the count’s veins.4 Haro and Philip IV’s Council of State stoutly defended the prerogatives of the grandees, who systematically downplayed the length and purity of foreign bloodlines. The Marquess of Los Balbases held that Thomas of Savoy had been given special treatment as he was the son of an infanta. Numerous precedents were put forward of foreign princes that the grandees refused to honour.5

Mazarin tried to impose the Count of Soissons by initially putting forward several candidates he knew to be unacceptable. In June he suggested the Duke of Guise, who had led the insurgent Republic of Naples in 1647–48. When the two principal ministers met at the border and a matrimonial agreement seemed within reach, on 21 August 1659, Mazarin suggested he should carry out the mission himself. As the king’s right-hand man, however, he was considerably over-qualified. He caused even greater consternation when he suggested concluding the marriage without an official proposal. Haro considered Mazarin’s suggestions to be nothing more than political manoeuvring.6 The intransigence on the French side was tied to the glorification of the royal blood via illegitimate bloodlines after Henri IV; it had already been debated at the Münster congress of 1648, where the Duke of Longueville had asserted his right to the French Crown. In 1659, it was held that an individual who embodied majesty could not be treated informally. There was a clash of two key principles of protocol, social rank and the quality of ambassador, the latter of which won the day.7

Mazarin’s immediate objective was to go against precedent without losing face, by not following the example of the Duke of Mayenne in asking for Anne of Austria’s hand in marriage in 1612.8 Haro read Mazarin’s mind perfectly and suggested on 26 August that a representative of lesser rank should be appointed, the conditions of the marriage having been decided by then. On 30 August, after talking the matter over with Louis XIV and Anne of Austria, Mazarin suggested choosing a duke and peer, putting Gramont’s name forward. He also argued strongly that the diplomatic mission should be relatively low-key and brief, as the

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4 Pimentel to Haro, 5 and 8 June 1659, AGS, Estado, leg. 1616, nos. 54–55.
6 Consulta of the Council of State, 23 June, 21, 29 August and 4 September 1659, ibid., nos. 17, 35 and ibid., nos. 36, 47. Haro to Philip IV, 21 August 1659, ibid., leg. 1623, no. 5.
8 Perrens (1869), pp. 393–417.
The aim of this chapter is to present the world of Spanish politics through the eyes of a diplomatic outsider (fig. 1). What it reveals is an emissary’s mental image of the court. He was, moreover, no ordinary envoy but a diplomat who, as we shall argue below, came from a country whose vastly different political culture stemmed from a similarly different hierarchy of values. Yet, at the same time, he became gradually acquainted with the complex world of the Spanish monarchy (the Monarquía Hispánica or, as it was called at the time, the Monarquía Católica) and the web of relations governing it. This newcomer from a distant land was not a complete stranger, nor did he feel like one. But he was all the same—as will be explained in detail—ill equipped to succeed within Madrid’s courtly microcosm. In addition, he was dispatched to press a hopeless case and furthermore lacked the financial means to do so. Indeed, the scholarly consensus is that the diplomatic mission of Stanisław Mąkowski to Spain was unsuccessful.¹ This does not mean, however, that it was also bereft of meaning. Admittedly, the diplomat’s political activity, which is known in broad outline, adds little to the history of Spanish politics. Rather, an attempt will be made to gauge the ambassador’s ability to unravel the rules governing Philip IV’s court, that is, the courtly modus operandi: the motives behind decisions as well as the deciding political criteria on which these were purportedly or actually based. The chapter is therefore intended as a study of mutual impressions and not as an analysis of bilateral relations.

In the middle of the seventeenth century, the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth (res publica or Rzeczpospolita) and Spain were not only geographically distant states, but also widely differing ones. The closer political and trade relations between the two countries before and during the Thirty Years’ War

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did not alter this basic fact. The two countries did not establish broader or more frequent relations such as would have fostered mutual understanding and helped overcome social and cultural barriers. In conducting political negotiations with the Vasa dynasty, the representatives of the Madrid Habsburg court were aware that the king and the gentry (szlachta) were two separate political entities, and that the rulers of the Polish-Lithuanian state had no authority to make binding decisions on international matters. The foreign policy of the Rzeczpospolita was in the hands of the szlachta sitting in the Parliament (Sejm), whose members opposed offensive policies as a matter of principle and were specifically against entering into alliance with the Habsburgs (fig. 2). The Polish-Lithuanian monarchs were one of three ruling bodies endowed with power to decide matters of state. Rulers were subject to state law just as the members of the szlachta were. As a society, the Rzeczpospolita was not hierarchised in the same way many western European societies were. The szlachta’s self-serving perception of the reason of state was tied to their belief in the importance of upholding their collective rights and freedoms as the cornerstone of the regnum-mixtum state system—a view at loggerheads with the place reserved for the sovereign as the indispensable capstone at the apex of the Spanish composite monarchy. The royal court of the Rzeczpospolita was not the main centre of power, favour

2 Urjasz-Raczko (2016).
The exceptional contribution to Italian Seicento culture made by Camillo Massimo (1620–1677) is well established among art historians of this period. A scion of one of Rome’s oldest and most prominent families, he combined his career as a high-ranking official of the Papal court with a wide range of intellectual interests, which he ardently pursued, becoming an esteemed antiquarian collector and a close friend of influential tastemakers like Francesco Angeloni and Giovanni Pietro Bellori, as well as a patron of contemporary artists including Nicolas Poussin, Claude Lorrain and Carlo Maratti.¹

A rising star of Innocent X’s hispanophile court, Massimo also befriended Diego Velázquez and sat for him wearing the bright blue costume of cameriere segreto in one of the memorable portraits made by the Spaniard during his second visit to Rome in 1649, when Philip IV gave him leave to seek appropriate paintings and sculptures for the refurbishment of Madrid’s Alcázar (fig. 1).²

Massimo’s ties to Velázquez and to Spain would be maintained: continuing his fast track in the church hierarchy—chierico della Camera Apostolica in 1651, Patriarch of Jerusalem in 1653—he was made papal nuncio to Madrid in 1654, a suitable appointment for the then head of a family whose members had been serving the political and military interests of the Spanish monarchy for decades.³ The prestige and importance of such a post within the diplomacy of the Holy See usually ensured elevation to the purple, even the papacy—both Innocent X Pamphilj and the future Clement IX, Giulio Rospigliosi,
demonstrated loyalty to the disgraced prelate, who relied on him for news, erudite reading material, gems, prints, coins and statues. An intense correspondence reveals how much the friendship they had founded on their shared reverence for classical antiquity deepened when Massimo faced a setback in his career and Bellori became his closest contact.59

**Dealings with a Spanish lady and matters of taste**

Massimo involved Bellori and the people who had been part of his household in Spain as middlemen in a most unusual transaction between Madrid and Rome, as he set out to buy Lorenzo Ramírez de Prado’s collection of ancient coins and medals. His Spanish friend had died, aged seventy-five, shortly after Massimo’s homeward journey in 1658, so Massimo asked Giacomo Fantuzzi and Antonio Maria Antonozzi to negotiate from the nunziatura with Lorenzo’s widow, Doña Lorenza de Cárdenas.

The descendant of a long line of Castilian nobles, Doña Lorenza had gone against her family’s wishes in 1639 when she married her second husband Ramírez de Prado, whose meteoric rise to the upper echelons of the state never entirely quashed the suspicions about his ancestors’ converso origins.60 Despite being an unequal match, the marriage lasted happily for nearly twenty years; after his death, as a childless widow she devoted her remaining two decades to single-handedly running numerous charitable works and

59 AM, vol. (or prot.) 276 (Registro II) contains Massimo’s letters from 1658 to 1663, the period in which he was exiled in Roccasecca dei Volsci. A selection of passages from this correspondence is transcribed in the documentary Appendix to this chapter.

60 Beginning with various privileges granted by Philip III, Lorenzo Ramírez de Prado’s long and brilliant career continued during the reign of Philip IV, who sent him to France in 1628 as ambassador extraordinary to Louis XIII in the context of the War of the Mantuan Succession.
ACROSS CONFESSIONAL BORDERS: AMBASSADORS FROM THE NORTH
Hendrick van Reede van Renswoude, ambassador of the States General to Spain, passed away on 19 September 1669. He had been the first official representative in Madrid of the High and Mighty Lords States General after Philip IV concluded peace with the Dutch Protestant rebels in Münster in 1648 and recognised the Republic of the United Provinces as an independent and sovereign state (fig. 1). Shortly before his death, Van Reede van Renswoude had converted to Catholicism, and his funeral, paid for by the Spanish Crown, was a triumph of Catholic pomp and circumstance. The States General might well have considered this spectacular and officially sponsored ceremony to be deeply offensive. Quite frequently, less serious diplomatic incidents were blown out of proportion, leading to cooler relations between countries, putting contacts on hold or even causing a more consequential political rift. At times, the discrepancy between a seemingly insignificant event and its international repercussions defied comprehension or even description.1 Diplomatic incidents could be at the source of conflicts between states and monarchs, but could also be provoked deliberately in order to pursue certain political goals. Yet, diplomacy, as it had developed in early modern Europe, also provided tools for avoiding an escalation of unpleasant episodes.2 If the public honour and dignity of a country were not at stake, the incident could be brushed aside, or else apologies could be demanded and offered, for instance by means of an embassy, in a specially designed reconciliation ceremony or through the conduct of negotiations.

Several diplomatic incidents that occurred between the Republic and Spain will be analysed in this chapter, as well as the ways in which both sides sought to neutralise them. The two countries, despite their long-standing hostilities and religious differences, maintained remarkably good relations in the second

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1. Attributed to Bartholomeus van Bassen and Anthonie Palamedesz, *The Ridderzaal of the Binnenhof in The Hague, during the Great Assembly of the States General in 1651* (detail of fig. 13), c. 1651. Oil on panel and copper, 52 × 66 cm. The Hague, Mauritshuis, on loan to the Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam.

half of the seventeenth century and averted the danger of letting protocol squabbles develop into thorny disputes. Such an appeasing attitude is consonant with the international state of affairs after the Peace of Münster. To be sure, neither of the two powers could afford an escalation of diplomatic incidents into serious conflict. In keeping with the focus of this volume on Madrid, the analysis will be limited to events occurring at the Spanish court. Moreover, in accordance with the book’s emphasis on performative and material aspects of early modern diplomacy, it will concentrate on the ceremonial trappings and the working conditions of Dutch diplomats in the Spanish capital and particularly on those of Van Reede van Renswoude, for which purpose the post-mortem inventory of his residence will be studied.

Spanish–Dutch relations and the international context

The 1648 Peace of Westphalia had allowed Spain to close the war front in the north. Its leaders had also been hoping that the Republic would become their ally, not only to protect the Southern Netherlands but also to supply funds and military equipment in the struggle against France and England. Dutch financiers were willing to lend money to the Spanish Crown and, with the consent of the government, businessmen provided weapons and shipbuilding materials for the armadas. But the Dutch were not willing to make a military and political commitment. Grand Pensionary Johan de Witt (fig. 2), the Republic’s most powerful politician between 1653 and 1672, believed that a rapprochement or commitment vis-à-vis Madrid would spur the French to invade and annex Spain’s possessions in the Low Countries. Despite Madrid’s insistence on the need for a common strategy to defend the Spanish Netherlands—especially because the English, too, saw opportunities to occupy Flemish ports—the realisation that De Witt did not even wish to appear genuinely interested came as a surprise to the Spanish. Louis XIV never concealed his irritation whenever De Witt alluded to a potential collaboration with the Spanish Habsburgs to protect the Southern Netherlands. At the very most, the Grand Pensionary would hint at such Hispano–Dutch cooperation to let Louis XIV know that he would not tolerate a French occupation or annexation. In truth, De Witt did not entertain any hopes of entering into a military alliance with Spain and believed that Louis XIV’s territorial ambitions south of the Dutch border could be held in check by means of an arrangement with the French monarch that would discourage the recourse to force.3

Yet the Republic was hardly in a position to set little store by preserving its good relations with Spain. The closure of the Scheldt and the blockade of the Flemish coast through a policy of tariffs were preconditions for continued Dutch success in trade and industry. Maintaining the favourable status quo agreed upon at Münster, which included Philip IV’s control over the Catholic Low Countries, was of paramount importance for the safeguarding of Dutch interests. Louis XIV’s proposals to divide up this territory

Sir Richard Fanshawe remains in many ways the forgotten man of the Cavalier court (fig. 1). He has attracted interest principally for being the husband of Ann Fanshawe, whose memoirs of their life together have become a classic source for gender historians. Yet, Ann’s recollections, which were written down many years after the event, have been largely responsible for the rather insipid image that we currently have of Richard as a trusty friend, loyal public servant and loving husband—an image that was certainly not shared by his fellow diplomats, nor by the judicial authorities of Madrid. In fact, serious research on Fanshawe has been concentrated almost exclusively on his work as a poet and translator. This essay will present him as someone who is worthy of attention, not just as a literary figure, but also for the part that he played in a wider sense as a cultural bridge between England and the Iberian world. Above all, it will be suggested that he was an ambitious man whose family background and early career at the time of the civil wars had placed him at the heart of the royalist establishment, and on close terms with Charles II. The failure of his hopes for high office following the Stuart Restoration in 1660 would lead him to take increasingly desperate measures to regain the confidence of the king, measures that would ultimately bring about his undoing. Let us begin, though, at the moment when his career appeared to have reached its zenith.


Besides the editors of this volume, the authors would like to thank María Castañeda, Peter Davidson, Todd Longstaffe-Gowan, Deirdre Marculescu, Laura Oliván Santa-liestra, Clare Sexton, Alan Thomson, Felipe Vidales, Leeanne Westwood and the research seminar groups of the Departments of History at the Universidade Nova of Lisbon and the Universidad Pablo de Olavide of Seville.

1 The more complex side to Fanshawe’s personality that will be presented in this essay has occasionally been hinted at by scholars, but only in passing. See Stradling (1968), p. 390 (n. 114), Feiling (1968), pp. 169–70, and Davies (1977), pp. 99–100.
‘Delight in wittie and ingenious things’:
Sir Richard as patron of the arts

An attempt by Fanshawe at self-fashioning in his diplomatic role can be seen in another commission with which he has tentatively connected, although here we must be more speculative. Sir Richard’s name has long been associated with a copy of the Somerset House Conference, a painting of which two versions exist (fig. 6 and pp. 12–13). The date and author of these two remain much disputed, arguments which it is not our intention to enter into here. 109 What is of interest is a document of 1681 that refers to a copy of this painting having been in the possession of Sir Richard Fanshawe. Francis Parry, a former ambassador to Portugal who had known Sir Richard personally, brought a version of the work back to England with him. He writes to Sir Robert Southwell, his own predecessor at Lisbon, that ‘you saw a copy of the picture at Sir Richard Fanshawe’s at Madrid; the design of the picture is a junta of five of Queen Elizabeth’s counsellors sitting at the table with six of the King of Spain’s’. 110 This is unlikely to be the version in the National Portrait Gallery, that was acquired at the Hamilton Sale in 1882, but could be the contemporary copy that is now in the National Maritime Museum in London.


‘Fashioning’
Sir Arthur Hopton

Todd Longstaffe-Gowan

Sir Arthur Hopton (1588–1650; fig. 1) was appointed secretary to the embassy of Sir Francis Cottington in Spain in 1629, and acquired a reputation for shrewdness not only as a diplomat but also for his activities as a collector, on behalf of Charles I and members of the Whitehall Group. He was described by Cottington as having ‘the kinges good opinion in a very large measure, & farr beionde any man hee hath lately imploied abrode’. John Evelyn, who knew him well, regarded him as a ‘most excellent person’,¹ and the poet and politician Edmund Waller praised him as ‘a very worthy person’ and one who ‘is not only a wise person in generall but most practically expert in the business of Spayne’.²

Like Sir Philip Sidney in the epigraph above, Hopton showed an interest in commissioning portraits of himself, of a kind that he envisaged as works of art in their own right, worthy of a place in his collection for qualities that transcend their role of defining and affirming his identity. Three portraits of him, by three different artists, survive; each successive image becomes increasingly ambitious and iconographically complex. The period in which this group of paintings was produced (c. 1638–41) corresponds with the diplomat’s metamorphosis from resident agent to knight and ultimately to ambassador to the court of King Philip IV of Spain.

Much has been written about Hopton as an enlightened connoisseur and his role as a cultural broker.³ There has, however, been little interest in exploring

I am grateful to Chloe Chard, José Luis Colomer, Jorge Fernández-Santos, Piers Baker-Bates, Alistair Malcolm, Amalia Descalzo, Susan Bracken and Alex Bell for their generous and informed input.

¹ Bray (1906), vol. 2, p. 5: entry of 7 June 1649.
² BL, Add Ms. 78315 (Evelyn papers—John Evelyn’s correspondence), fol. 103: Edmund Waller to John Evelyn, Rouen, 14 August 1647. Ibid., fol. 76: Edmund Waller to John Evelyn, Rouen, 17 August 1647.
his rich personal iconography. This chapter takes the portraits as its primary point of reference for an exploration of the various ways in which he envisaged his career as a diplomat and collector, constantly engaged in managing cross-cultural encounters and, as his correspondence demonstrates, strongly aware of the network of other practices with which the viewing and collecting of art became entangled. Although the tradition of British ambassadors having their likenesses painted was by this time reasonably well established, few individuals took such a personal and sustained interest in using portraiture as a mechanism for projecting themselves in their career. The portraits of Hopton tell us a great deal about his conscious and measured efforts to fashion himself as a ‘Compleat Gentleman’—a loyal, informed and educated courtier in the service of the Crown, and a noble representative of the kingdom in foreign parts.

Education, diplomacy and collecting

Sir Arthur Hopton was born c. 1588, the fifth son of Sir Arthur Hopton of Witham Friary, Somerset. Privately educated, he matriculated at Lincoln College, Oxford, on 15 March 1604/05, and was admitted to the Honourable Society of the Middle Temple on 11 November 1609, where he remained until 11 February 1620. After this, very little is known of him until 1629, when he travelled to Spain as secretary to Sir Francis Cottington, the then newly appointed ambassador extraordinary (fig. 2). Hopton appears, however, to have had an interest in Spanish affairs from the early 1620s as his ‘true friend’ the historian and political writer James Howell wrote to him from Madrid on 5 January 1622/23 to report that the ‘treaty of the match twixt our Prince [Charles] and the Lady Infanta is now strongly a foot’, describing the fair complexions of both this princess and the king and the contrasting ‘Spanish hue’ of their brother Don Carlos.

After his appointment as secretary to Cottington’s embassy, Hopton readily adapted to the Spanish way of life, and his fluency in speaking and writing Castilian made him popular and influential at court. Although we are concerned here primarily with his role as a cultural broker and a purveyor of works of art, the activities he carried out in this regard, although considered part of the normal currency of exchange and competition between the European courts, were secondary to his official duties. His responsibilities as resident agent (after Cottington’s departure in 1631)
In April 1663, Cornelius Pedersen Lerche (fig. 1),\(^1\) who had recently returned home from a stint as Frederick III’s representative in Madrid (fig. 2), wrote a report on the relations between Denmark and the Spanish monarchy.\(^2\) The report, which dwelled primarily on the global state of affairs between both powers, included certain passages focusing on key individuals. The Duke of Medina de las Torres, then one of the most influential courtiers, was identified as a ‘generous prince’ (genereux Förste).\(^3\) Lerche pointed out that Medina liked to receive gifts such as amber rosaries and crucifixes.\(^4\) After Luis de Haro’s passing in 1661, the Duke of Medina was acknowledged as a highly influential nobleman at the Habsburg court, and it was understood that any diplomat was well advised to win him over.\(^5\) Medina was not the only individual who attracted Cornelius Lerche’s attention: a much less known figure, Manuel Pantoja y Alpuche, was singled out as someone who had to be conveniently flattered if Danish interests in Spain were to be adroitly served. Lerche’s comments on these two men were anything but offhand. By 1663 Cornelius Lerche was experienced enough to be able to spot the most useful information for his sovereign—to whom the report was addressed. Lerche was well aware that interpersonal relations were often key to ‘global politics’, and that ‘doing diplomacy’ in mid-seventeenth century Europe meant unravelling the personal allegiances and the often hidden mechanisms that kept a foreign court running.\(^6\) Diplomatic missions, which were complex activities unto themselves, help unveil much about Europe’s courtly

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1. José Antolínez, *Ambassador Cornelius Pedersen Lerche and His Staff* (detail of fig. 13), 1662. Oil on canvas, 186.5 x 215.8 cm. Copenhagen, Statens Museum for Kunst.

1 Several spellings are found for Cornelius Pedersen Lerche’s surname: Lerche, Lercke, Lerque or Lerke. Following the *Danish Biografisk Leksikon*, we will use ‘Lerche’, which is also the most frequently quoted.
2 KB, GKS, 2715 quarto Memorandum by Cornelius Lerche, dated 9 April 1663.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
5 On Medina de las Torres, see Stradling (1976) and Martínez Hernández (2016). I wish to thank Santiago Martínez for kindly providing a copy of his article.
world behind the scenes. Studying Cornelius Pedersen Lerche's two missions in Madrid (1650–55 and 1658–62) provides an insight into this world in general and into the political, social and cultural life of Philip IV's court in particular, as well as its links with the rest of the continent.

The early modern court and diplomacy in the Baroque age

In order to best explore what Cornelius Lerche’s missions tell us about Philip IV’s court, some brief comments are due on the nature of the early modern court and the place foreign dignitaries occupied in it. The court was a complex social organisation in which the foreign diplomat was both a participant and an observer—one whose aims were unlike those of the ‘regular courtier’. As a social organisation, the court perpetuated the nobility’s grip on power, ensuring courtiers had privileged access to plentiful resources ranging from economic to symbolic. It also became the centre of a burgeoning bureaucratic apparatus designed to serve the interests of the sovereign and the ruling elite, spawning increasingly complex forms of statehood. In this sense, the court as an organisation combined—not without contradictions and conflicts—stratified or hierarchical and functional or operative means of differentiation. Even if foreign diplomats chose to further their own agenda at the expense of their ruler’s, the conduct of diplomacy required them to behave as courtiers and adapt to the makeup of the foreign court to which they had been posted. The complexity of the early modern court was not only functional but also spatial and material. Prized objects in circulation and placement at court functions defined a visible and even tangible hierarchy. Madrid was the main stage where Philip IV’s court displayed itself and where courtiers and diplomats resided and interacted—not just at the royal palace, but all around the city. Members of the court often showcased their elite status through objects, be they clothes, books or artworks. Last but not least, European courts were collective entities and kept watch on each other from a distance, with ambassadors and diplomatic agents acting as the eyes and ears of their rulers and governments and of their respective courts. A broad range of information was passed on, not only by letter but also by means of refined or exclusive objects that were dispatched or taken back home by returning diplomats and which spoke of the material culture of foreign courts. In short, objects as well as processes help tell the story of the early modern court, and both are key to grasping what Lerche’s missions reveal about Philip IV’s court in its final fifteen years.

Philip IV’s court as seen through Lerche’s missions

Cornelius Pedersen Lerche resided in Madrid first between 1651 and 1655 and again between 1659 and 1662. There was a substantial difference between the date of appointment and the actual date of arrival in Madrid. While the exact dates of arrival and departure cannot be ascertained, available documentation helps set chronological limits. Since Lerche’s first instruction was dated

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A sudden and surprising change in the relations between Spain and Sweden took place in 1650. After the Peace of Westphalia, European statesmen carefully reconsidered old animosities or alliances, and the sovereigns of the kingdoms of Sweden and Spain—distant from each other not only geographically but also in terms of religion, politics and culture—now realised that a closer relationship might in fact be mutually beneficial. This essay will discuss the Swedish embassy to Madrid in 1651–52, its background and its consequences.

The years between the conclusion of the Thirty Years’ War in 1648 and the abdication of Queen Christina in 1654 have been the subject of intense study. Many scholars have scrutinised the events leading up to the abdication and subsequent conversion of the young monarch, but it has not been possible to reach a consensus on the underlying reasons for her dramatic renouncement of both throne and faith. Queen Christina was a master of dissimulation and always made sure no one ever divined her ultimate objectives. The careful assessment of extant sources has therefore been of the greatest importance. The historian Curt Weibull noted that, despite the abundance of sources on every aspect of the queen’s life, when it came to ascertaining the true motives steering events, this plethora of information, consisting mostly of gossip, biased accounts or conventional praise, proved largely ‘worthless’.

Weibull, a champion of the principles of source criticism, maintained that the view of Christina and her life gleaned from an indiscriminate reading of the sources was, and could only be, inconsistent. Although perfectly aware that biased sources could and did prove valuable, he was no doubt right. The
and Andalusia.\textsuperscript{76} Thus Spain could be said to be hampered by its lack of uniformity, being as it was a conglomerate of former kingdoms holding on to their own customs, legal system and administration.\textsuperscript{77} Christina would easily realise the extent to which its diverse constitutional structure weakened the Spanish Empire.\textsuperscript{78} Spain’s various realms made use of the Crown’s income to their own advantage, often to enhance and display their own renown and glory, common resources being squandered as a result. The administrative apparatus was extensive: there were as many ‘senates’\textsuperscript{79} as there were former kingdoms, not to mention presidencies, chambers, chancelleries and tribunals beyond count.\textsuperscript{80} The already innumerable and continuously increasing administrative posts generated by this system were up for sale (venalia), with all available resources being devoured by a gargantuan bureaucracy that kept a tight

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{image}
\caption{Vicente Carducho, \textit{The Expulsion of the Moriscos}, c. 1627. Ink, pencil and blue wash on paper, 380 × 504 mm. Madrid, Museo Nacional del Prado.}
\end{figure}

\begin{notes}
\item[76] In point of fact, only the Nasrid kingdom of Granada was conquered by Ferdinand and Isabella. The other territories mentioned by Palbitzki had been seized by Christian rulers well ahead of the final phase of the Reconquista.
\item[77] For a broad-based comparison between Sweden and Spain in the seventeenth century see Mörner (1998).
\item[78] ‘[…] non exiguam debilitatem hinc Imperio Hispanicco nasci viderit’.
\item[79] The word \textit{senatus} here refers to \textit{cortes}.
\item[80] ‘Tot senatus fere quod Regna, Praesidetias vero, cameras, Cancellarias et Tribunalia quis enumeret’.
\end{notes}
SMALL ITALIAN STATES
AND THE SUBLIME PORTE
Among the thirty or so individuals who represented the Republic of Genoa in Madrid during the reign of Philip IV (1621–65)—varied in their roles and diplomatic tasks, and ranging from resident gentlemen and *incaricati* to veritable ambassadors, both ordinary and extraordinary—a truly outstanding figure for both his personal qualities and fame was Anton Giulio Brignole-Sale (1605–1662; fig. 1), an exact contemporary of the Spanish sovereign. Suffice it to recall that his mission to the court of the *Rey Planetario* or Planet King between June 1644 and August 1646 was only one of many significant achievements during a not very long but full life, remarkable for his political activity but above all for his notable literary output. In the still fundamental monograph on this Genoese gentleman, written over a century ago by Michele De Marinis, an entire chapter is dedicated to that ambassadorial appointment,1 but—based as it was exclusively on the correspondence between Brignole-Sale and the government of the Republic—the account only addresses the motivations, fulfilment and consequences of his task. Research carried out for the present text, drawing from archives in Spain and elsewhere relating to those two years, allows us to add a wealth of information, indeed leading us to believe that our protagonist’s experiences in Spain, in all its aspects (sometimes dramatic), played a part in his subsequent decision, in the year his wife died (1648), to abandon worldly existence and embrace religious life.


1 De Marinis (1914), pp. 249–62. For his diplomatic mission, see also Costantini (1986), especially pp. 335–36; and Gallo Tomasinelli (1994), pp. 3–32; as regards the individual it is worth reading De Caro (1972).
3. Anthony van Dyck, Paola Adorno Brignole-Sale (see pendant, fig. 1), 1627. Oil on canvas, 282 x 151 cm. Genoa, Palazzo Rosso. Musei di Strada Nuova.
This chapter will address the story of the negotiations between Galileo Galilei (fig. 1) and the court in Madrid as attempts were made to have the Spanish navy adopt the method he had ‘discovered’ for measuring marine longitudes. These dealings lasted for years and involved the active diplomacy of the Medici at the court of the ‘Catholic King’. We shall consider modes of contact and how Galileo put forward some of his inventions, and how cultural and scholarly communication functioned between the Tuscan scientist and those responsible for politics and culture at the Spanish court. This case study, in both its means and limitations, thus allows us to analyse the role of diplomacy in scientific communication, a subject that has been little studied but remains open to in-depth approaches. In this respect it is important to study some of the individuals who played the role of ‘intermediaries’ between the two sides, paying special attention to the curiosities and cultural stimuli of those involved in diplomacy (whether agents, envoys or ambassadors, both ordinary and extraordinary)—individuals who could play a role in cultural mediation, not always carried out with planned or explicit purpose, but often effective in facilitating the circulation and exchange of information.1 The background of our discourse is defined by the broader and more personal and scientific outline of Galileo, which at certain points obviously comes to the fore.

Before concretely presenting the story and its implications, we cannot omit some of the remarks on the rich historiographical context in which this can be


I should like to thank Federica Farino and Maria Antonietta Visceglia for reading this essay and offering stimulating commentary. Elisabetta Stumpo kindly located and identified the medal representing Giuliano de’ Medici di Carellina (fig. 13) and provided much appreciated support with iconographic research.

REGNI ET STATI DEL RE FILIPPO, ET DEL GRAN TURCO CON LE LORO ENTRATE, ET SPESE, ET ALTRE COSE NOTABILI

Nell'Africa ha il Re Catholicus

1. Il Regno d'Oro, con la superiorità del Regno di Tunisi.
   Fuori dello Stretto di Gibilterra.
2. L'Isola Canaria, & il Vecu duino in molti Regni.
   In Europa
3. La Spagna, che comprende il Regno di Castiglia, Toledo, Lione, Granada, Andulogia, Biscaglia, Navarra, Galizia, Aragon, Valencia, Catalogna, l'Isola Maiorca, & Minorica.
4. La Costa di Borgogna.
5. Toscana, cioè la Friuia, & Orfisul, Malines.
   Quello Ducato, che fono Brabanzia, Limburg, Lecemburg, & Ghedini.
   Sci conditi me n'ero, bata, che fono la Francia, Namur, Artois, Hanonia, Aelanda & Zelandia.

Nell'Italia

Il Regno di Napoli, di Sicilia, di Sardegna, & il Regno di Milano.

Quelli, che più de gli altri hanno pratico particolarmente delle cose de gli stati, &

del modo, come fono fatti.

Causa il Re Catholicus

Delli Detti di Castiglia, & de gli affogazioni di Carlo quinto all'imperatrice, va million 4,000, & 500,000 ducati.

Di Sicilia, & dell'entrare dello Almorazizaggo maggiore, & de l'entrere delle mercanti de l'Africa tanto di 1,000,000 ducati.

Delle State di Gazzapoz so 7,000,000 ducati.

De' Porti tia del messa filieri, ducati.

Del serafio Montefag 45,000 ducati.

Del Sale 3,000,000 ducati.

Entrate dittere gli rendono 65,000,000 ducati.

Quella che fischia Faida crescere in que' ducati.

Gli dritti delle Mercante de Porgello cento mila.

Il Scintifico ordinario, & l'Intramontabile de' Regni di Spagna 400,000 ducati.

Sono merci che vengono di Francia, & Espana 250,000 ducati.

Le contributi de' Mercanti che trafanno in l'India 55,000 ducati.

Le minore de' Regni 100,000 ducati.

Di Catalogna, Valenza, Aragon per lo feretro delle conti di Montoro 44,000 ducati.

Gli dritti delle Mercante d'Orosso gli danno 50,000 mila.

Le merci che vengono di Francia, & dell'Ingheilterra, & di Francia 200,000 ducati.

L'Isola di S. Maeritza, di S. Agnolo Alcante, & Caffarega 15,000 ducati.

L'Isola del campo di Calatora, & d'altri luoghi 35,000 ducati.

L'Indice vanno per l'altro rendono 150,000 ducati.

Altri titoli, & suffetti 400,000 ducati.

De' sacri baiu in million d'oro

De' sacri baiu in 70,000,000 ducati có preso il donario d'ogni 3 anni.

Di Milano in 7,000,000 ducati.

Di Sicilia più di 100,000,000, &

Di Sardegna 100,000,000 ducati.

Tutta questa entrata fono million 150 ducati, & 95,000 ducati.

La spesa de l'Impero, che è stato 10,000,000 ducati, & di nuo che de' dritti, e de' tolli, e de' dritti de' mercanti, & de' dritti de' nobili.

Altri è stato 15,000,000 ducati, e 3,000,000 ducati.

Il maggior neme dell'Impero fono nel numero di cento ottanta mila cau
doli chiamati i capi di guerra, & in fra molte altre cose necessarie per continuare il suo impero, quasi 7,000,000 d'oro.

In Europa

La Romania, che comprende.

La Grecia, che lenist, cioè Scizia, & Morea, L'Albania, la Bosnia, la Bulgaria, & nella Macedonia, la Turquia, & la Bucovina, & la Breva fino a confini di Vincenza.

Nell'Africa

La Natalia, che comprende.

L'Africa, l'Armenia, la Mecidja, la Persia, la Sicilia, che fono detto de' Mori, la Cilicia, la Cappadocia, la Mesopotamia, la Bussina, Alexantrida, l'Ero, & Cipri.

Principi dicono che questi due grand Principi hanno inciso le insinature entrare.

Causa il Turco

Dell'Asea in millione, & 500,000,000 ducati compreso un ducato, è metto, che paga ogni Christiano qui cada in pace.

Dell'Impero di Araba 300,000 ducati.

Dell'Impero di Cairo, & di Arabia in millione & 200,000 ducati.

Della Turchia in millione & 200,000 ducati.

Della Melopotamia 200,000 ducati.

Della Moldavia per tributo 150,000 ducati.

Della Vlachia per tributo 20,000 ducati.

Della Transflanbia per tributo 10,000 ducati.

Di Ragusa per tributo 10,000 ducati.

Di Sfico per il tributo gla 10,000 ducati.

Di Cipri oltre 8,000 ducati.

L'acquisto delle parenti, privilegi, brevetti, commissariamenti, & altre scritture publize fono 100,000 ducati.

Delle robe, & facoltà di chi more senza heredi e causeranno 300,000 ducati.

Le ministe 20,000,000 ducati, & 50,000 ducati.

L'acquisto di tutti i datr, & doni rei dello Impero, va millione, & 200,000 ducati.

Tutte le decime d'imprese, & l'infinita 100,000 ducati.

La somma di tutto quella entrata fono Millioneotto, & 350,000,000 ducati.

Spende il Turco nel mantenere i suoi proutot, gli huomini di guerra, & in fra molte altre cose necessarie per continuare il suo impero, quasi 7,000,000 d'oro.

Egli se fu Regni, & stati ha pochissime forze; le quali sono date fatte da Chiari, & polizza da lui occupare.

La mettita de' suoi Granatazi; qui fa la forza delle sue armi, effusata in torna a 16,000 ducati.

Il maggior neme della sua macina fono in numero de cento ottanta mila cau

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Il maggior neme della sua macina fono in numero de cento ottanta mila cau

IN PERVIGIA per Pietro Paolo Orlando

Con Licentia de' Superiori.
The Unexpected Ottoman Guest: Ahmed Agha in Madrid (1649–50)

Jorge Fernández-Santos and Hüseyin Serdar Tabakoğlu

The Turk has arrived in Spain and although subject to a different law his presence affords great glory to the king—provided he deceives us not.

Hence the diligence and cunning that shall shield us:
to honour him without loss,
to cheer him without spending,
to take leave of him without delay and to turn him down without falling-out.

Salvador Jacinto Polo de Medina (1650)

The arrival in Madrid in the late summer of 1649 of an Ottoman official styling himself as the Sultan’s ambassador was, to say the least, unexpected. Travelling at inordinate speed with the minimum of attendants and luggage the emissary reached the gates of Madrid literally on the heels of the couriers dispatched in haste by the viceroys of Naples and Valencia to warn

1. Kingdoms and States of King Philip and the Great Turk with Their Respective Revenues and Expenditures and Other Remarkable Things (Perugia, p.q. 1640, broadsheet). Rome, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale Vittorio Emanuele II.

1 A La venida de Mhomet Mostafâ Hagâ, Embax. del Gran Turco, que entrô en Madrid, a 15 de Sett. de 1649: ’El turco ha venido a España / y aun[que] de distinta ley / es gran gloria para el rey / sí en algo no nos engaña: / pero la yndustria, y la maña, / q[ue] nos sabrá defender / es, honrarle sin perder / festexarle sin gastar / despedirle sin tardar, / y negarle sin romper’. BHAM, Ms. R/2629(21), p. 328. The poem’s attribution to Polo de Medina is based on BNE, Ms. 23129(17), fol. 5r. The same poem has been misattributed (?) to an obscure poet named Fermín de Sarasa y Arce on the basis of HSA, cod. B2492, fol. 93r (no. 109). See Serrano de Haro (1986), pp. 241, 261.

2 Dujčev (1935), p. 144. Astonishingly, Agha completed his long journey in about two months. He employed precisely 11 days and 8 hours from Constantinople to Ragusa (Dubrovnik). Consulta dated 4 September 1649 in AHN, Estado, leg. 2879. The Ottoman envoy arrived in Trani on 19 July 1649. BNE, Ms. 2437, fol. 213r.
Since Kara Murad Pasha refused to renew Ahmed Agha's credentials and accept Spanish mediation between Ottomans and Venetians, Allegretti concluded that the former had no real interest in peace. On 2 May 1650, Allegretti, who had arrived on 31 March, was given leave to return to Madrid.\(^6\) The Spanish agent reported that Ahmed Agha, whose main task was to prevent Spain from helping Venice, should be regarded as the grand vizier's personal envoy. Although the sultan had been informed, Agha's entire mission depended squarely on whether Kara Murad Pasha managed or not to stay in office.\(^6\) As it turned out, when the Venetians blockaded the Dardanelles in the summer of 1650, Kara Murad Pasha's rivals seized the opportunity to overthrow him, forcing him to step down on 5 August 1650. His trusted advisers, the müneccimbaşı and Budak-zâde, were sent into exile and subsequently put to death.\(^6\)

**‘Ambassadorial’ credentials lost in translation**

The imperial letters that Ahmed Agha handed over in his second audience at the Alcázar in 1649 bore no tughrâ (imperial monogram). In contrast, one of the missives presented to Allegretti in Istanbul the following year was headed, as was customary in Ottoman imperial letters addressed to European rulers, with the sultan's monogram (fig. 4). Although it took nearly a year, which was the time that had elapsed between Agha's arrival in Madrid and Allegretti's return to the Spanish capital, this highly significant detail did not escape the notice of Spanish statesmen. Like most unofficial missives, the letters Agha brought with him in 1649 included only the signature and seal in the right margin.\(^6\) Contrary to standard diplomatic correspondence, the wording left no doubt that it was Kara Murad Pasha representing Mehmed IV with full authority (vekâlet-i mutlaka-i saltanat-i ‘alyye olduğunumuza binân) and not the sultan himself who was addressing Philip IV in writing.\(^6\) It is true that the sultan, then only a child, was unlikely to be directly involved in state matters. Moreover, it may be argued that the sultan's grandmother Kösem Valide Sultan, the true power behind the grand vizier, may have manipulated the diplomatic correspondence with Spain.\(^6\) It was after all she who had disagreed decades earlier with her young son Murad IV and most leading statesmen on the wisdom of a truce with Spain. Venetian diplomats reported in 1625 that Spaniards had pinned their hopes solely on Rejep Pasha, on Bayram Pasha and on the Sultan's mother and daughter.\(^6\)

62 Özcan (1999), pp. 494–95. İpşirli (2007), pp. 1264–68. When it was discovered that, in fact, the müneccimbaşı Hüseyin Efendi had never left Istanbul, he was summarily executed. See İpşirli (2007), pp. 1271–74.
63 ‘Oi se reconoçe por las cartas citadas [que] d[on] Alegreto ha trahido, y […] si bien en la del Gran T urco que aora se ha traduçido confiesa que [Ahmed Agha] vino con su sabiduría y consentimiento, diçe que le embió su visit, y esta carta así en la firma como en el sello y aforro en que vino cubierta es diferente de la presentó a V[uestra] Mg[esta]d Amete Aga, y aquélla, y la // que ahora ha trahido Alegreti en nombre del visit, son vniformes en todas las señales sin diferencia ninguna’. See the consulta of the Council of State dated 5 September 1650 in AHN, Estado, leg. 2871. Moreover, on the verso of doc. 11 (quoted in note 64 ut infra, Appendix A2) one reads in seventeenth-century writing a clear reminder that although its bearer Ahmed Agha claimed it was a sultanic missive, it was merely vizierial: ‘Carta que trujo el embajador Amete Aga quando vino de Constantinopla a Madrid por agosto de 1649. Y si bien quando la presentó este embax[ad]or para ser oído de Su M[ajestad]d dijo que era del Gran T urco, se reconoció últimamente, por otras que vinieron después, no ser ésta sino del primer visit’.
65 AHN, Estado, leg. 4257, exp. 2, doc. 11 (Appendix A1, A2).
67 Moreover, Bayram Pasha, governor of Egypt, was married to one of Kösem’s daughters and it is likely that the admiral Rejep Pasha was also Kösem’s damad or son-in-law. Peirce (1993), p. 226.
68 On Grana, see Tercero Casado’s chapter in this volume. For Grana’s involvement in reporting Agha’s activities in Madrid, see Tercero Casado (in press).
69 Consulta dated 4 September 1649 in AHN, Estado, leg. 2879.
The role played by Fulvio Testi (1593–1646; fig. 1) throughout his career exceeded the traditional duties of a diplomat, minister or secretary of state. Indeed, he contributed significantly to shaping the image of Francesco I d’Este (1610–1658; fig. 2) and almost became his alter ego, deciding on political leanings, stimulating ambitions and recommending appropriate conducts.¹

Born in Ferrara in August 1593, Testi was the son of Giulio Testi, a lowly officer of the court of Este, and Margarita Calmoni, who died when Fulvio was only four. He was schooled by the Jesuits in Modena and went on to read philosophy at Bologna and Ferrara. In 1612 he became a scrivano to Duke Cesare d’Este and two years later married Ana Leni, a native of Modena. Testi very soon began to conduct himself with a violent anti-Spanish bias in political and diplomatic affairs. He expressed this sentiment in the Pianto d’Italia, composed in 1613 and reprinted in Modena in 1617, which earned him temporary exile.² In 1619 he was appointed as virtuoso di camera and went on to hold various diplomatic posts as representative of the Duke of Modena in Rome, Genoa, Mantua, Turin, Milan, Venice and Vienna, which enabled him to secure a fief and the title of count.³ His rantings against Spanish control in Italy published two decades earlier do not seem to have been a hindrance to his twice being designated as the Duke of Modena’s ambassador extraordinary to Philip IV in 1635 and 1637.

The purpose of this appointment was ultimately to persuade the Spanish king to grant the highest honours to Francesco I—if possible the title of Highness

¹ Signorotto (2012), p. 25.
² Essential works on Testi’s life continue to be Tiraboschi (1780) and Castro (1875/1960).
³ Castro (1875/1960).
Returning to the Duke of Modena’s stay in Madrid, on the 24th he took oath of office from the king as general of the armadas. Most likely as a result of this appointment, Velázquez was commissioned by Philip IV to paint another grand portrait of the Duke of Modena, this time eques-trian, showing Francesco I attired in his general’s uniform, of which the painter was also instructed to make a copy if the end result proved satisfactory. In addition, Philip IV took Francesco I to visit two royally founded convents very closely connected to the Crown: the Encarnación and the Descalzas Reales. The latter had been the residence of the duke’s sister, Caterina Maria d’Este, who took the habit there in 1622 at the age of eight and died, still too young to profess, on 23 January 1628. The convent preserved several portraits of her (fig. 14), and it is highly likely that Francesco I prayed before his sister’s mortal remains during his visit.

The day of his departure saw another exchange of gifts between the Duke of Modena and the king and queen, which was reported on by all the chroniclers. Deciding on the gift had been a lengthy process: Testi had made enquiries about the monarch’s and the count-duke’s tastes and had insistently recommended that his master choose for Philip IV a painting by Correggio—who was not represented in the royal collection—and another by Guercino, Guido Reni, Veronese, Dosso Dossi or Girolamo da Carpi, which would be easy to transport. Despite realising that the duke, as an art lover, would be loath to part with them, Testi believed they were a necessary sacrifice for the sake of achieving more important goals.

Although, judging by the correspondence Cardinal Caetani in Rome exchanged with Cardinal Carlo de’ Medici, the Duke of Modena initially appeared to have followed his ambassador’s recommendations, Francesco I finally gave Philip IV sixteen magnificent horses; Isabella of Bourbon received a ‘casket of rock crystal with gold mounts, studded all over with diamonds and other precious stones with a cross on top, all made of diamonds, and the cross is worth 25 silver [coins] and the casket is furthermore full of gold and jewelled flowers imitating real ones’ on behalf of the Duchess of Modena, Maria Farnese; and the Count-Duke

112. A copy of the oath and title are preserved in the AHN, Estado, libro 269, fols. 83v–84, 94–98.
113. Venturi (1881), p. 49.
116. Sánchez (1997), p. 384. Vilacoba and Muñoz (2010), p. 131. Sor Catalina’s body is now buried together with that of Sor Margarita de la Cruz in one of the convent’s vaults in the cloistered area in a tomb whose headstone bears the following inscription: ‘Aquí yacen las S[er][enísi][mas] S[eñor][as] Sor Catalina M[ari]a de Este, hija de los príncipes de Módena, y Sor Margarita de la Cruz, hija del S[efor] D[o]n Juan de Austria. Falleció la primera siendo religiosa novicia de esta real casa en el año 1628 y la segunda religiosa profesa en el año 1686. R.I.P.’ I am grateful to Ana García Sanz, curator of the convent of the Descalzas Reales, for helping answer my queries.
119. We know from a letter from Testi dated 15 September 1638 that these horses were initially intended for the valido, but he refused to accept them and only consented to their being given to the king, Testi (1967), vol. 3, p. 61.
Advice on governance

Advertencias para reyes, principes y embajadores was the title of a book published in Madrid in 1643. Its author was Don Cristóbal de Benavente y Benavides, Count of Fontanar (c. 1582–1649). Born in Valladolid and a knight of the Order of Santiago, he had served Philip IV (fig. 1) as a distinguished ambassador at several European courts.1 The book was a treatise on politics, a compilation of advice on good governance (fig. 2). It aimed to suggest rules for monarchs—no doubt especially Philip IV—and also for princes, who were expected to govern: the book was dedicated to the Prince of Asturias, Don Baltasar Carlos, Spain’s then well-grounded and subsequently dashed hope. But the advice was also—and this is what concerns us here—aimed at ambassadors, who are regarded not so much as mere instruments of governance than as jointly responsible for, and architects of, the wholesome and appropriate policy which the author of the book, imbued with Baroque wisdom, set out to advocate, advise and even decide on. He thus presents ambassadors as being capable of acting alongside kings, who could do with being advised on how to conduct politics well.

The era—the throes of the Baroque period—was a time of advice on prudence. Three years later Baltasar Gracián published his Oráculo manual. But the book by the ambassador Count of Fontanar was a treatise on political prudence and good governance—in theory at least. Such works were also abundant during the period. Politics was not only a reality that was played out on the complex European stage but also a doctrinal concern that required a combination of wise maxims and pithy notions and suggestions, as

1. Diego Velázquez, Philip IV in a Yellow Doublet (detail of Longstaffe-Gowan, fig. 13), 1628. Oil on canvas, 205 × 117 cm. Sarasota (Florida), John and Mable Ringling Museum of Art.

This text was originally published in Ochoa Brun (2005).

1 Benavente y Benavides (1643). He was appointed as ambassador to Philip IV in England and in the Empire in 1629, in Venice (1624–32) and in France (1632–35). Benavente was also a member of the Council of War.
In fact, the iconography of Philip IV, generally austere and always supremely dignified, contrasts with the insufferable frippery of the sumptuous and smug portraits of Louis XIV, dripping with ermine, his sickly figure raised on deceitful pretentious heels. For Velázquez and Rigaud are poles apart.

There are also poetic portraits of Philip which underline the elegant sobriety of his attire and his human impulses. Manuel Machado’s tercets are famous. Less well known, perhaps unfairly, are those of a sonnet that is more relevant here as it was written by a poet and diplomat.

72 ‘Nadie más cortesano ni pulido / que nuestro Rey Felipe, que Dios guarde, / siempre de negro hasta los pies vestido’ (Nobody is courtlier or more refined than our King Philip, may God preserve him, always dressed in black from head to foot). Except that Machado got the portraits mixed up and referred to Philip as sporting the glove that is worn by his brother the Infante Don Carlos.

73 It begins ‘Claro los ojos, pálida la frente, / el oro del cabello desteñido, / claro el rubio bigote retorcido, / grueso el labio, la barba prominente’ (Light-coloured eyes, pale forehead, the gold of his hair faded, a pale crooked blonde moustache, full lips, prominent chin).